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This thesis investigated the state of affairs which
existed between Cuba, the USSR and the U.S. from a his-
torical, as well as a current perspective. It further
employed Content Analysis to code a representative sample
of FBIS Reports for Latin America from April 1970 through
September 1974 to determine if Cuba's recent attitudes
towards the world have been recently changed or altered.
It then contrasted and compared these attitudes with Cuba's
manifested behavioral patterns towards the world which
resulted from applying current WEIS procedures to the
Journal, Latin America , over the same time frame. It deter-
mined that generally, Cuban attitudes are not indicative
and representative cf Cuban behavior, and over the long
run, it found that an increasingly favorable attitudinal
and behavioral situation existed between Cuba and the U.S.,
and Latin America, while the relationship between Cuba and
the USSR was inconsistent and erratic.
The research is intended to serve as a methodological
and informational tool to aid the policymaker and/or
intelligence officer in assessing the current disposition
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The significance of Cuba in the present-day world is
far greater than its size or population would indicate.
What occurred in this Caribbean nation with the coming to
power of the revolutionary regime of Fidel Castro attracted
world-wide attention; and, the questions and conflicts that
swirled about this event, as well as the success or failure
of the Cuban Revolution, became among the most important
and controversial issues of our times.
The Revolution is important, first of all, because of
the immense changes it wrought in Cuban society. It was a
profound social, economic, and political revolution which
destroyed forever the older patterns of life on the island
and carried with it enormous implications for the future.
The Revolution affected every mode of Cuban existence and
all of its people, some for the better, others for the
worse.
But the impact of the Revolution was felt far beyond
Cuban shores. Cuba was the first openly Communist state
in the Western Hemisphere and the first Latin American
ally of the Soviet Union and, as such, a center of conten-
tion between the super powers. As a pawn in the Cold War,
Cuba was bartered and manipulated by the two super powers,
9

while the interests of Cuba herself were generally ignored.
This was most notable during the 1962 missile crisis when
the United States and the Soviet Union stood "eyeball to
eyeball" while the world tensely waited to see who would
blink first or whether the confrontation would result in
nuclear war. Cuba remains a center of contention in the
Cold War and/or detente and in the conflict between the
Soviet Union and China, as well as a focus of crisis and
upheaval throughout the Caribbean and Latin American region,
Cuba has also attracted the attention of third world
leaders from Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a possible
model for rapid social and economic development. In an
era when the aspirations and demands of the peoples of the
underdeveloped nations—the "revolution of rising expecta-
tions"—have reached higher and more intense proportions,
the Cuban experiment is being watched closely not only in
the Western Hemisphere but in other developing countries
as well. Whether these emerging nations will be able to
achieve change through more or less democratic and evolu-
tionary means or join Cuba in the resort to dictatorial
and violent methods is a crucial issue, by no means fully
decided.
The Cuban Revolution and the Castro regime, further,
have increased the complexity of political development and
10

modernization in Latin America and possibly dimmed the pros-
pects for the growth of democracy in the area; now, a third
force—one which favors totalitarian methods and close
alliances with the Communist nations—has been injected
into the struggle. Democratic development was made more
difficult because the extreme left Fidelistas and Commu-
nists frequently worked in concert with the traditional
conservative forces to penetrate the middle way of the
social democrats and to provoke coups against those moder-
ately reformist governments that seemed to be providing a
Democratic alternative to Communism.
The major reasons for Cuba's significance are inter-
related. The many exiles from Castro's Cuba, for instance,
have helped exacerbate tensions in the Caribbean and have
become important political forces in the countries where
they have settled; by the same token, the issues of
"Communism" and "Fidelista infiltration" have proved ex-
tremely divisive and troublesome in many of the Latin
American nations. In some, guerrilla warfare and urban
terrorism—with the inspiration and frequently the training
and equipment derived from Cuba—have also proved disruptive
and brought on increased United States intervention in a
period of rising nationalism. At the same time the Soviet
Union clearly has a large stake in seeing that the Cuban
11

experiment succeeds, while the United States has an inter-
est in seeing that the Revolution and other similar move-
ments in Latin America fail. What happens in Cuba, therefore,
has enormous implications not only for Cuba herself, but for
the United States and the Soviet Union, for Latin America,
and for much of the underdeveloped world. /Ref.55, p. 229-231/
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I. HEMISPHERIC - CUBAN RELATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years after Fidel Castro's rise to power,
Washington and Havana remain virtually deadlocked in
mutually uncompromising positions. The continuing climate
of recriminations and reprisals in U.S. - Cuban relations
now stands in sharp contrast with the dramatic and sudden
thaw in U.S. - Chinese relations, and detente with the USSR,
Nevertheless, until just recently, the state of affairs
between the two countries could be summed up in a dialogue
between President Nixon and Castro in April 1971. President
Nixon stated that Havana's policies precluded the type of
initiatives then underway tov/ard China. The President
pointedly noted that Castro "was still exporting revolution"
and that "until Cuba changes their policy toward us we are
not going to change our policy toward Cuba." Three days
later, Castro responded by vehemently reaffirming Cuba's
"solidarity" with the Latin American revolutionary move-
ment, adding that Cuba could in fact afford to "scorn
relations with the imperialist government of an empire on
the decline and defeated on every front." /Ref. 17, P- 722/

A more recent indication of this lack of accommodation
between the two countries is apparent after analyzing two
recent news events which received worldwide attention.
The first involves the State Department approval of auto-
mobile sales by subsidiaries of the "Big Three" U.S. auto-
makers. Naturally, this evoked favorable endorsement by
many of the world's leading political analysts, some of
which went so far as to suggest that such a maneuver could
possibly indicate a significant change in U.S. resolve.
Rather than let such comments go without clarification,
the State Department immediately stated that "the deal is
not really that important and certainly it should not be
interpreted as a change in U.S. policy towards Cuba."
/Ref. 25, p. 2/
The second instance involves a statement made by the
Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Dr. Fernandez Lopez Maino. In
summary, he stated that Cuba would be willing to talk with
the United States about a resumption of relations if the
12 year old economic embargo were to be removed. He also
said that the continued U.S. presence at the Guantanamo
Naval Base would not preclude talks. "We are not in a
holy war with the U.S., but we will never undertake nego-
tiations while the blockade is in effect, " Lopez said.
/Ref. 35, p. 10/
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In only a matter of a few days, Lopez, sounding like a
man who had spoken to his Foreign Office, virtually denied
making such statements and accused the capitalist news
agencies of "distorting" and "misinterpreting his words."
/Ref. 35, p. 10/ It is this type of "feeler football"
which, in the past, has kept the official position of the
two countries firmly at odds with one another. The situ-
ation can be briefly summarized as one in which each
country is assuredly careful not to have any statement or
indications attributed to it, for fear that it may be
accused of foregoing it's previous "hardline" position
and succumbing to the opposition.
Nevertheless, the events of recent months have pointed
toward a less antagonistic relationship. This began with
the resignation of former President Nixon; the September
visit to Cuba by two U.S. senators, the first trip of its
kind in fourteen years; the subsequent release of American
political prisoners; and finally, intermittent signs from
Cuba that it was no longer inflexibly opposed to improved
relations. These were indicated by Castro when he inferred
that the time may be ripe for an improvement in Cuban-
American relations. In contrast to President Nixon,
President Ford "is not involved with the Cuban counter-
revolutionary elements, " Castro said.
15

"Nixon was personally very much involved with them.
And we see in Ford a man who is above this. . ."
"In our opinion, we see Ford with a certain hope in
the sense that he may after all adopt a different policy
towards Cuba, and that at least he does not have the per-
sonal involvement that Nixon had in this regard. " /Ret.
9, P. 2/
In this chapter I wish to take a closer look at the
background and present status of the rift between the U.S,
and Cuba, while specifically examining the political,
ideological, economic and military ramifications, and
their implications on the other Latin American countries.
I shall also focus on the so-called pay-offs and costs
that must be considered before any future improved re-
lations can be expected to materialize.
B . BACKGROUND
Notwithstanding the rhetoric which transpires between
the two countries, the United States may now need to re-
examine its own vital interests in the light of recent
Cuban developments. As evidenced by recent events, both
the U.S. and Cuba appear to be developing limited common
interests that could be exploited by a more flexible U.S.
policy. For the present however, the policies of the two
countries seem to be based on antagonistic stances having
16

their origins in the past, many of which no longer appear
to be a credit to their respective national interest. ^/Ref,
17/ p. 723/ Regardless of these observations, neither the
U.S. nor Havana appear to intend to be the one that makes
the first move. Since this apparent standoff has trans-
fixed U.S. -Cuban relations for well over a decade, it may
be of benefit to examine the present state of affairs and
where it is leading us.
The goals and purposes of the U.S. posture could
properly be described as dynamic, since the Castro take-
over. In the early 1960 's, as evidenced by the Bay of
Pigs invasion, it was clear that the overthrow of the
Castro government was the primary objective of the U.S.;
at present, although "getting rid of Castro" may still
be utmost in the minds of many politicians and adminis-
trators, the facts must be faced in that the Cuban
Revolution is here to stay. Fortunately, for those who
support the Revolution and unfortunately for those who do
not, U.S. policy cannot be based on a decreasingly prob-
able expectation of a drastic change of government in
Cuba in the near future.
C. PRESENT POLICY GOALS
In view of this fact, what has been the rationale and
what have been the goals of our recent policy? The
17

"official" thinking seems to be focused on the following
three goals: /Ref. 15, p. 193/
1. To isolate the "revolutionary virus", thus pro-
tecting other peoples and nations from the spread
of Castroite activities, influence and revolution.
2. To make the Cuban developmental effort as costly
and sluggish as possible, thus both discrediting
the Cuban model and weakening the legitimacy of
the current regime. (In official circles, it is
thought that progress toward this goal should con-
tribute toward goal number one)
.
3. To embarass, instruct and increase costs to the
Soviet Union by forcing the Russians to "relate
to" and support a Communist government that they
cannot easily control, and which might in fact,
prove to be a developmental failure. Again, pro-
gress toward goal number two should contribute
*
(in official view) toward goal number three.
Let us now take a brief look at the actual practices
which comprise the official posture toward Cuba and dis-
tinguish them from the three forementioned goals. A
* Publicly, United States officials do not usually artic-
ulate and defend the United States posture towards Cuba in
terms of any except the first of these three goals.
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summary of official, public practices currently in force
would include at a minimum, the following:
1. No diplomatic or consular relations with Cuba (the
Swiss represent U.S. Interests)
.
2. No monetary, trade or commercial relations with
Cuba except as specifically authorized by the
President or his representatives.
3. No travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba except as
specifically authorized by the Department of
State.
4. Various administrative and political pressure
brought to bear on governments that sell, ship
and otherwise furnish goods to the Castro govern-
ment, and
5. Exclusion of the Castro government from partici-
pation in the Inter-American system (through a
series of OAS resolutions directly attributable
to actions taken by the U.S.).
D. CONGRUENCY OF PRACTICES WITH GOALS
The basic distinction between a set of goals and a
set of practices (not necessarily related to those goals)
brings to mind one question of utmost significance:
TO WHAT EXTENT DO CURRENT PRACTICES ACTUALLY CONTRIBUTE
TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOALS SET OUT?
19

The fact is, the practices enumerated above represent
largely an accumulation of retaliatory decisions, accidents,
antagonisms, and inattentions that certainly should not be
construed as linking a rational means to an end. The actu-
al means, primarily the economic embargo, has in fact, been
irrelevant to Cuba's external relations. By perpetrating
a direct and now purposeless injury on the Cuban people,
we have violated one of our traditional principles of war-
fare which is noncombatant or civilian immunity. "The
U.S. embargo has become a massive, indiscriminate tool
which injures all Cubans resident on the island." ^Ref.
11, p. 112/
One should not conclude from the foregoing that the
embargo was always a purposeless policy. As a matter of
fact, with regard to the policies of the late Eisenhower
and early Kennedy administrations, the embargo actually
represents a de-escalation. As a sign of flexibility
and moderation, it sought to appropriately respond to the
ever-present and increasing dangers of export of revo-
lution from Cuba. The policy had narrower and— it seemed
then—more achievable goals than preceeding policies, in
that it used butter rather than guns to fight Cuba's ex-
ternal policies. Although the means and ends seemed
appropriate for the time, the embargo has shown itself to
20

be inappropriate with the passing of time. It has failed
the test proportionality. /Ret. 11 p. 113/
One would be equally incorrect in concluding that the
accidental and retaliatory nature of our practiced goals
necessarily implies that they have not contributed to the
articulated goals. However, the extent to which these
goals have been achieved have only been remotely related
to the practices employed. A prime example of this is
the failure of Castro inspired armed rebellion and guer-
rilla activities, which can more properly be explained
by the technological and tactical sophistication of U.S.-
Latin American military teams, the opposition of the
Soviet Union to armed struggle in the hemisphere, the
nationalism of many of the politically oriented Latin
Americans, and the difficulty of politicizing peasant
populations. In other words, the necessary "objective
ingredients" for the spread of Castroism were not suf-
ficiently exploited; thus, any success achieved in con-
taining Castroism should not be attributed to diplomatic,
economic or cultural isolation of the regime. Additionally,
it appears that Cuban mismanagement, economic idealism,
precipitious centralization, problems with East European
trading partners along with natural disasters, have been
largely responsible for the sluggishness and costliness
of the Cuban economy. /Kef. 15, p. 194/
21

E. UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT POLICY
WHAT ARE SOME OF THE LESS DESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES AND
UNANTICIPATED COSTS OF THE PRACTICES NOW ENGAGED IN? This
appears to be the next logical step in examining both sides
of this situation. The opposition and hostility of the U.S.
apparently benefits the Cuban regime in at least two ways.
First, a sense of emergency has been created which stimu-
lates and reinforces a sense of solidarity or of "being in
it together." Second, the leadership is frequently being
spared from having to face the consequences of its own
mistakes because the opposition and hostility of the U.S.
are readily exploited to explain shortcomings and existing
problems. /Ref. 15, p. 195/
In this vein, it should also be noted that in the post-
1959 period, a new generation of technical and military
elite has emerged who simply may not subscribe to older
fidelistas ' intense antipathy toward the "Colossus of the
North, " and who may now be attracted by the Chinese pre-
cedent. /Ref. 17, p. 733/ Thus, for these older and younger
elements in the Cuban leadership, some form of accommodation
with the U.S. may present the only possibility for improve-
ment of Cuba's economic situation, lessening her dependence
on Moscow, and undercutting the further rise of pro-Soviet
elements on the island. Castro flatly rejects such a
22

solution as a "surrender" to the U.S. In the meantime,
the preservation of Cuba's revolutionary posture requires
some level of external tension with the U.S.
One of the supreme ironies of the present Cuban situ-
ation then, is that any accommodative rather than an
aggressive U.S. approach could confront Castro with such
difficult choices that it might indeed pose a more threat-
ening situation. /Ret. 17 p. 733/ In summary, we can say
that Castro's defiant posture serves a twofold purpose;
it deters moderate elements from seeking any form of rap-
prochement with the U.S., while at the same time, it dis-
courages Washington from adopting a more conciliatory
approach toward Cuba.
Of concern to the U.S. is the amount of prestige that
is being lost and the considerable degree of ill-will gen-
erated both in Western Europe and in Latin America as a
result of the almost unilateral attempts to "interdict"
the Castro government. In spite of the perceived high
cost of persuading the Europeans to fully cooperate in the
policy of economic denial, the U.S. decision-makers never-
theless apply pressure to otherwise friendly governments
in hopes that they will climb on the anti-Cuban bandwagon
in some fashion. As a result of U.S. success in influencing
and instituting guiding sanctions and punitive measures
23

against Cuba through the OAS, many Latin Americans unquestion-
ably feel ill-used by the manner in which they came to have
—
and now must operate with—a Cuban policy not of their making
/Ref. 15, p. 195/
It would appear that any restraints which our European
allies exercise in their trading with Cuba are more a re-
sult of Cuba's ability to pay, than our policy of economic
denial, or our allusions to Cuba's Soviet military depen-
dency and commitment to the export of violent revolution.
This can be verified by the fact that Western European
trade with Cuba is increasing at the rate of 20 million
dollars per year. Other non-Communist countries have now
extended some 200 million dollars in commercial credit to
Cuba, as evidence of their belief in Fidel's ability to
produce and sell not only Cuban sugar, but also Cuban beef,
seafood, citrus fruit and nickel. British-built fishing
boats are on Cuban seas, and European-built machines of
all kinds are serving the Cuban market. Canada and Mexico,
two of the most productive and influential of the hemis-
pheric states, have been exporting foodstuffs to Cuba, and
both appear to be experiencing more unrest, as a result of




In conclusion, Viator states,
that so long as the boycott continues, there will per-
sist in this island a sort of seige mentality; this un-
doubtedly makes it easier for the regime to organize
—
as they are now doing— the economic life of the country
on a military basis designed to secure the maximum
effort during the critical year or two to come. It
also provides the Government with a re_ady-made excuse
for economic failures. /Ret. 53 p. 32_1/
F. REQUISITES FOR NEGOTIATION
In spite of our outdated policy, the U.S. views have
undergone several modifications since its institution.
Today, Washington concedes that the Castro regime seems
entrenched, and it no longer insists—as originally for-
mulated in 1964— that Cuba break her military, economic
and political dependence on the USSR. Nevertheless, there
are still two "preconditions" which also have to be met
before the U.S. would consider altering its present policy.
First, the cessation of Cuban "mischief-making" attempts
to "export revolution" in the hemisphere. Currently claimed
as the prime objective of our policy, and at the same time,
the end of such mischief-making is frequently referred to by
U.S. officials as a "requisite" to any normalization of
U.S. -Cuban relations. This appears to be somewhat of a
sterile, unproductive approach for the following reason.
If Cuban "hemispheric hooliganizm" is really as bad as we
officially see it, then its termination or containment
25

should become a goal of our policy and not a prior condition
to which the other side may not wish to agree. On the other
hand, if we honestly admit that the punitive measures were
imposed for reasons other than "hemispheric hooliganism",
the Cubans could insist on the lifting of these measures
as a requisite for reciprocal termination of "hooliganism".
The second precondition is that Cuba must cease its depend-
ence on the Soviet Union for a substantial portion of its
economic and military well-being. However, official
attitudes vary on this point since there are many who seem
satisfied to see the Soviet Union burdened and occasionally
embarassed by the Cubans, while on the other hand, many
officials emphasize the "unacceptability " of the current
Soviet presence in Cuba. /Ref. 15, p. 196/ It appears
evident that a more sound policy would concentrate on
lessening the Soviet presence rather than trying to use it
to burden or discredit the Soviets. Again, however, it
must be emphasized that nothing is to be gained or realized
by requiring the Cubans to renounce Soviet aid as a requisite
to normalized relations with the U.S. No matter how much
Cuba might favor the latter, under present circumstances,
they cannot afford to do the former.
G. EXPORT OF REVOLUTION
I have deferred further discussion of Soviet penetration
26

to the following chapter on the Soviet-Cuban relationship,
and have proceeded to focus on the first of these two pre-
conditions. It can be generally stated that Havana's rev-
olutionary subversion of the hemisphere is no longer the
threat that it was during the 1960's. Cuba's removal from
active pursuit of the guerrilla path in Latin America can
be attributed to five basic reasons: /Ref. 11 p. 10J5/
1. Cuba's increasing concern with its own development.
2. The defeat of Guevara and other key guerrilla per-
sonalities .
3. Effective U.S. counterinsurgency support to govern-
ments engaged in fighting guerrillas. (These inter-
national guerrilla efforts must be differentiated
from our Cuban policy since they are aimed at other
Communist countries as well.)
4. Over the past fourteen years it appears that the
closeness of relations with the Soviet Union are
inversely proportional to Cuba's support of guerrilla
movements
.
5. Tendency towards status quo of Latin American govern-
ments .
Most of these reasons are self-explanatory with the exception
of the last two, which I believe, warrant further discussion.
In the past Castro was able to exercise considerable
27

independence in pursuing his own foreign and domestic
policies, and on occasion challenged Moscow whenever it was
in his interest and capacity to do so. He even went to the
extreme of purging the pro-Soviet "microfaction" in early
1968, making verbal attacks on pro-Moscow Communist Parties
and derogatory statements about some of the Latin American
countries with which the Soviet Union was trying to improve
overall relations. But, since then he has not possessed
adequate bargaining measures. Owing to repeated economic
failures over the last four years—and most critically, to
the failure to produce the ten-million ton sugar harvest in
1970—his regime has been forced into a position of growing
subordination to the Soviets. ^/Ref. 17 p. 131/ The result
of this has been more participation in Cuban foreign and
domestic policymaking and a general tendency to "eliminate
the options" available to the Castro regime for independent
action.
The Castro movement in Cuba had had a deep and obvious
appeal to many Latin Americans. Castro, the man, was cast
to their tastes, in the classical Spanish heroic mold:
individualistic, personally courageous, emotional, eloquent,
and messianic. They rather enjoyed the prospect of a Latin
American country, any Latin American country, standing up
to the United States, regardless of the issue. They tended
28

to sympathize with Castro's thesis that American business
interests had dominated the economy long enough, and most
Latin Americans felt that what happened in a small, histor-
ically unstable country was really not terribly important
anyway. However, Castro's eloquence was found to be a mask
for mendacity, as he announced himself a Marxist, shaped
his regime in the pattern of Soviet-style socialism, and
dropped all pretense of a free press and the elements of
constitutional democracy. Then, in a clumsy, overt way,
the Castro government began to meddle in the internal
affairs of other governments of Latin America. "Inter-
ventionism" suddenly assumed two new facets. This inter-
ference was Cuban, and intervention was no longer viewable
as a United States monopoly. And, for the first time, the
conservative nature of the Latin American governments
prompted them to ask themselves whether they too ought to
do some intervening in order to keep the Castro situation
in hand. They responded through the OAS by cutting off
diplomatic relations with Havana.
H. INCONSISTENCY OF GOALS
The U.S. policy goals must now be viewed as internally
incompatible. The effort to reduce Soviet influence in
Cuba may increase the probability of Cuban international
recklessness since the reduction of Cuban militance seems
29

to be a direct function of its increasing Sovietization.
In other words, by insisting on Cuba's continued hemispheric
isolation, the U.S. has contributed to a situation whereby
Havana, in effect, is being encouraged to pursue revolution-
ary rather than diplomatic interest in Latin America.
Equally important, the U.S. remarks have contained no signal
to the Cubans that the issue of increased Soviet military-
political penetration and not the issue of "exporting rev-
olution"—whether symbolic or actually implemented—has now
become the most objectionable factor in the Cuban situation.
Regardless of this omission, our policy instruments are
counterproductive in that they fail to provide any incentives
for Cuba to behave in such a way as to achieve either goal.
I. COSTS AND SACRIFICES WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED BY
CONCERNED PARTIES
I would now like to address several important factors
that must be considered as obstructions, or at best, ad-
verse reactions to the openings of constructive dialogue
between the two countries. These can best be lumped into
the following broad areas, military, domestic, and ideo-
logical/political.
1. Military
Cuba is aligned with a foreign power that is dedicated
to the destruction of American democracy. Soviet military
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personnel serve in advisory capacities to Cuba's sizeable,
well trained, well equipped army. Soviet Russia has attemp-
ted to capitalize on the geographic position of the island
to alter the world balance of power by neutralizing some
of the strategic advantages the United States has enjoyed
in overseas bases and missile strength.
Cuba's armed forces of course, regardless of their
strength or ability, pose little threat to the United
States. In a conventional war, Cuba could at best, provide
a diversionary effort. The island could be easily neutral-
ized but not without cost of lives and equipment. In terms
of nuclear war, the island's location gives Russia the ad-
vantage of dispersal for its weapon systems. Close prox-
imity to the United States gives an added advantage in that
relatively cheap, more accurate, short range or intermediate
range missiles may be effectively deployed against the
United States. The missile crisis dramatically demonstrated
that it is possible to secretly transport and emplace nu-
clear missiles. In a one shot nuclear war, such missiles
could have devastating results for the United States. In
this context, the island has assumed major strategic im-
portance ./Ref. 6 p. 206-208/
There are many uses to which Cuba could be put by the
Russians: Missile base, naval base, intelligence center,
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tracking station and base for subversion come readily to
mind. Already Cuba has experimented with many of these
employments. As a base for subversion, Cuba has been
successful in supplying men and equipment to cause trouble
in the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Panama, Bolivia and
Chile. It is in this regard that Cuba poses its greatest
threat to Latin America. Any attempt at large scale
military invasion of another nation could be easily thwar-
ted by the United States but covert infiltration of prop-
aganda, sabotage and guerrillas is almost impossible to
control.
For use by the United States, Cuba has little to offer
Guantanamo Bay (Gitmo) is presently used for fleet re-
fresher training and could easily be replaced by Roosevelt
Roads, Puerto Rico. As a base for long range patrol or
for staging troops and equipment for Latin America deploy-
ment, Florida or Puerto Rico offer equal facilities. The
island's time honored role of protecting the Panama Canal
would be meaningless in a nuclear war and very minor in
conventional conflict involving aircraft carriers and sub-
marines.
The Cuban situation even if exploited to its fullest,
could probably not affect the world balance of power. The
strategic power of the United States does not depend on
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what happens in Cuba. A strong Soviet military power in
Cuba could however, divert sizeable segments of United
States* military forces and the island could become a polit-
ical pawn in, for instance, another Berlin crisis. ^/Ref. 6
p. 209-22JL/ We must remember that it is not Castro him-
self, but the increased Soviet penetration of Cuba—which
in turn could facilitate the development of even greater
Soviet strategic capabilities in the Caribbean— that now
severely endangers U.S. vital interest. In conclusion, we
can say that although Cuba is not necessary to the United
States as a base, in order to preclude future alarms and
veiled threats to United States ' security, Cuba should be
denied as a base to a potential enemy.
2. Domestic
I will now focus on the domestic consideration which
can provide a disincentive to Washington to change its
policy. Primary among these is the large Cuban exile
community, partly neighboring on the Florida White House.
They have had ties with the conservative political opinion
in the U.S. for sometime, and they also act as a powerful
lobby against normalization of Cuban-U.S. relations. While
for Castro their absence from Cuba lessened an internal
threat to his regime, their presence in the U.S. makes
settlement highly impossible without shouts of betrayal.
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The Cuban exile communities have in effect reconstituted
themselves as a "little Cuba", recreating the privileged
structure and professional heirarchy that existed in pre-
revolutionary Cuba. Their mini-world now exists as a
pressure group to deny the present in the name of the past.
/Ref. 24, p. 132-133/ One such group, known as the Citizens
Committee for a Free Cuba provides a steady stream of alarm-
ist reports: of Cuban caves chockablock with IRBM's, of
secret Soviet submarine bases along the Cuban coasts, of
the sinister implications of recent Soviet-Cuban discussions
about providing Cubans with the knowledge and equipment
necessary for exploring the uses of nuclear energy. /Ref.
39 p. 244/ Such thinking is certainly ill-purposed and
could be dangerous. It could well be that attempts to re-
establish relations would unleash a series of invasion
attempts that could only compromise the U.S.
3. Ideological/Political
The factors of greatest importance would probably be
the political and ideological costs. Should the U.S.
attempt accommodation with Cuba it would have to be pre-
pared to treat Castro as a peer. Such a move would certain-
ly be interpreted at home, most of Latin America and the
world, as a tacit admission of failure and defeat of the
U.S. by a fourth rate power. Implicit in such a movement,
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however carefully conceived and implemented, is the con-
clusion that we would be prepared to accept Castro—despite
his being an outspoken proponent of an ideology that we and
our Latin American allies have formally and repeatedly
branded as alien to the values and interests of the Western
Hemisphere. We must recognize that we have been unable to
accomplish Castro's failure; and because we have been com-
mitted to that failure for so long and so openly, we should
have to anticipate that Fidel might be less than gracious
in his victory.
Adverse reactions could be expected from many of the
Latin American regimes, as well as the landowners, some
businessmen, and representatives of traditional orders—
-
who would be upset by any softening of our Cuban posture.
Elements of the left would also be suspicious, not only
because moves towards accommodation would desecrate their
image of Fidel as being ideologically pure, but also because
they desperately require the U.S. to be pictured as an in-
tractably reactionary, imperialist enemy. /Ref. 39 p. 247/
In the U.S., numerous sectors of the public would in-
veigh against normalization of our relations with Cuba.
If the radical right did not raise the cry of treason, it
would surely appeal to the Monroe Doctrine, threats to our
national security, to the American flag and American ideals.
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From the left would come a barrage of deceit charges, dis-
simulation, and double-dealing. Some of our more radical
groups such as the S.D.S., Black Panthers, etc., would ex-
press the view that no society as incurably corrupt and
rotten as ours could possibly reach a sincere agreement
with Fidel. /Ref. 39 p. 248/ In conclusion we could sur-
mise that an accord would demonstrate America's contention,
that Castro's ideology was alien and dangerous to the values
and interest of the Western Hemisphere, was false.
4. Economic
From a commercial viewpoint, Cuba has no overpowering
value. After all, the United States has lived successfully
for several years without benefit of Cuban trade. There is
no denying that access to Cuban markets would be welcomed
by United States' business; a market is a market, and
businessmen and the United States' government are keenly
aware that expansion is one answer to declining profits and
restoration of a favorable trade balance.
Future mercantile transactions could not approach pre-
Castro levels. Russian, British, French and Chinese pro-
ducts have been pouring into Cuba for years and it is not
reasonable to believe that these goods or their spare parts
could be completely replaced by United States' products.
Cuban sugar has long been replaced by Latin American and
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United States' sources. If Cuban sugar were to again be
available, the United States could not purchase amounts
equal to pre-1959 levels without alienating our present
suppliers. Since sugar remains the major cash product of
Cuba, whoever purchases the majority of Cuban sugar will
also most probably be the major supplier of commodities to
Cuba.
Finally it would not seem likely that American invest-
ors would again gamble large sums in a nation with Cuba's
history of expropriation and debt repudiation. Even if
American business was willing, we cannot gauge how readily
Cuba would accept U.S. investments after years of a "Cuba-
si—Yangui-no" national philosophy.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the President may
well conclude that the costs are simply too heavy to bear
at this time. Presently, he is under no great domestic
political pressure to reach an accord with Castro, and he
could not expect any great political reward for doing so.
It appears that the U.S., at acceptable costs, can
maintain its present Cuban posture indefinitely. However,
as the President is aware—and the American public should
be—Fidel can just as readily maintain his intransigent
posture toward the U.S. Fidel does not believe that his
regime is endangered from within and he knows that the
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Soviet Union will not abandon him. Thus he feels that
time is on his side and not ours, and he can afford to
wait. As he waits, he expects to see even larger and more
meaningful exchange between Cuba and his worldwide trading
partners. He expects to see growing disaffection for
hemispheric Cuban policy in the U.S. and the Latin American
countries. ^Ref. 39 p. 248/ In brief, he expects to see
increasing isolation of the U.S. rather than Cuba, at least
as far as Cuba is concerned.
J. BENEFITS AND PAYOFFS
If such are some of the important costs that we must
consider, what corresponding benefits might we expect to
justify such costs.
On the plus side of the ledger it would seem that an
accord with Castro would remove a source of potential fric-
tion between the United States and the Soviet Union. Second,
in terms of hemispheric solidarity, the agricultural and in-
dustrial potential of Cuba is of inestimable value to the
development of some form of Caribbean trade or even political
alliance. "Were Cuba to rejoin the Caribbean, it would be
possible to make long range economic plans which would fit
Cuba's capabilities and limitations to the broader regional
pattern in the interest of the greatest welfare for the
whole area. Third, a relaxation of the United States'
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attitude toward Cuba would ease relations with our allies
who have continued trade with Cuba against United States
wishes. Third World nations might also become more amenable
to United States overtures if they no longer viewed Cuba a
victim of U.S. aggression. /Ref. 24 p. 133-134/ Fourth,
although U.S. policy had no effect on Cuba's abandonment of
militancy, it would probably help to insure the continuation
of Cuban withdrawal from active guerrilla support, if it
changed policy. Fifth, while- recognizing that existing
diplomatic channels are sufficient, it is obviously more
effective if one has direct relations. Indeed, the argu-
ment for universal diplomatic relations (the Peking analogy)-
with scoundrels as well as angels--is becoming more convin-
cing. Additionally, it might open the door for more collab-
oration on specific functional problems, including
repatriation of remaining American citizens and coordinated
hurricane tracking. Sixth, even though Cuba was quite able
to absorb a lot of pressure from the Soviet Union for a long
time, it is quite probable that relations with the U.S.
would give Cuba more bargaining power with the Soviets and
perhaps aid in preventing that part of Sovietization which
the Cubans would rather do without. /Ref. 11 p. 109/
K. PROGNOSIS
Since this is an age for designing scenarios with the
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potentiality of reducing conflict, one might establish cer-
tain stages by means of which a re-establishment of normal
relations between Cuba and the U.S. might occur. Moreover,
we must acknowledge that whatever the form and however
achieved, any process of accommodation with Castro is going
to be slow, difficult and painful. It will have to be
attained on the basis of incremental steps that are seen
as reciprocally advantageous to us, to Castro, and to the
other states of the hemisphere. It will also have to be
achieved under the watchful eye of the Soviet Union.
Just as there was no historical precedent for isola-
ting Cuba in the hemisphere, so there are no clear paths
to follow if a decision is made to attempt a reintegration
of the Castro regime under conditions that do not conform





At the invitation of Fidel Castro Ruz, First Secretary
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba,
and Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government of the
Republic of Cuba, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, paid an official friendly visit to Cuba from 28
January to 3 February 1974. Meetings and talks at Havana
dealt with the state and prospects for development of
Soviet-Cuban relations as well as a wide range of important
international problems. The joint Soviet-Cuban Declaration
signed at the end of the visit, recorded complete mutual
understanding, unity of purpose of the USSR ?md the Republic
of Cuba, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the
Communist Party of Cuba and their steadfast loyalty to the
Marxist-Leninist teaching. It summed up the 15-year ex-
perience of truly internationalist cooperation between the
world's first socialist country and Latin America's first
socialist state. /Ref. 21 p. 3/
The Cuban purpose in inviting the globe-trotting
Brezhnev for the new year in Havana was clear enough. For
the 15th anniversary of the triumphant entry of his guerrillas
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into Havana, Castro wanted the Kremlin chief as star guest
to show his own people and the world that Cuban socialism
had really made the grade. The Russians certainly have no
expressed qualms about backing Castro—and have been doing
so to the tune of well over one million dollars a day—
a
probable conservative estimate—since the early 1960's.
In giving Brezhnev an astonishing red carpet treatment,
the Cubans have leaned over backwards to erase any awkard
memories of moments when Soviet-Cuban relations were not
quite so warm. Nevertheless, it is surprising that Fidel
Castro, with his reputation for highly individual, if not
downright wayward foreign policy departures, should at
this stage of the Cuban revolution see the future of his
country so closely identified with that of the Soviet
Union. Of course, it must be recalled that for the past
seven years—ever since the death of Che Guevara in Bolivia
in October 1967—Castro has been quietly and unobtrusively
falling in with the Soviet Union's view of the world.
This chapter will investigate the evolution of the
Soviet-Cuban alignment from 1960 to the present, and the
impact of the United States and China on this developing
relationship—with a prognosis of the effect of this
relationship on future Soviet policy in Latin America.
It will focus only on the highlights of this period which
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have direct implications and/or ramifications on the con-
tinuing relationship between these two countries.
B. THE CUBAN-SOVIET ALIGNMENT
1. Pre 19 59 Cuban-Communist Relations
We can sum up in a few words what we know of the re-
lations between Cuba and the countries of the socialist
camp up to February 1960. In 1959, a delegation of the
Central Council of Soviet Trade Union left Moscow to take
part in the celebration of 1 May in Havana, but because of
visa difficulties, arrived after the celebrations had taken
place. /Ref. 7 p. 436/ In June of the same year, at a ban-
quet given in Castro's honor by Cuban journalists, Kung
Mai, "the representative in Cuba of the Chinese News Agency,
"
sat next to Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, an influential Cuban
Communist Party official. The following month a Chinese
press delegation spent three weeks in Cuba and from then
on the arrivals of journalists from Peking became so numer-
ous that by November, according to C. P. Cabell of the CIA,
the Chinese correspondents had set up their general head-
quarters in Havana./Ref. 45 p. 82/
For their part, Cuban visitors to the Iron Curtain
countries, almost all members of the Cuban Communist Party
(PSP), initially showed their preference for Peking, as
was to be expected in view of the excellent relations
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maintained by the PSP with their Chinese comrades. /Ref. 45
p. 82/ In October the PSP sent a delegation to China on the
occasion of the anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic.
As for trade relations, the Soviet Union bought half a
million tons of sugar in 1959, approximately the same as in
1955, but much more than it had bought in 1956, 1957 and
1958 when the figures were 235,000, 395,000 and 207,000
tons, respectively. At the end of 1959 the Chinese bought
50,000 tons.
I have cited these data simply as part of my current
function as a "historian." They are of no real import.
All such visits and transactions could have continued with-
out affecting the evolution of Cuban affairs. Our question
then is how and why was Castro and Cuba driven in, drawn
in, or perhaps if we choose, forced into the Communist camp?
2. Post 1959 U.S. Communist -Cuban Relations
The Soviet Union failed to respond to Castro's early
overtures with the speed or in the form that he wanted.
One reason was surely that after the conversation between
Khrushchev and Eisenhower in September 19 59, Soviet-American
relations were dominated for a time by the optimistic
"spirit of Camp David." At such time Khrushchev would
hardly endanger the chances of achieving some or all of
his objectives through negotiation by showing an excessive
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interest in the Caribbean. /Ref. 45 p. 83/ Hence Cuban
contacts with the Soviets developed slowly.
That there were difficulties involved is suggested by
Castro's initiative at the beginning of December 1959, when
he called a conference of underdeveloped countries. This
was apparently a maneuver to heighten his own importance in
Khrushchev's eyes by suggesting the role that Cuba might
play in cooperating with Soviet foreign policy among the
countries of the "third world. " It seems unlikely that
Castro would have launched this plan—which ended in a
resounding failure—if he had been certain of a favorable
Soviet response to his blandishments. /Ref. 18 p. 100/
On 15 December, it was announced that the Soviet trade
exhibition would arrive in Cuba in January 1960. At the
beginning of that month there arrived the "directors sent
to prepare the exhibition, " probably among them other
Soviet agents who had been instructed to report on the state
of affairs in Cuba. /Ref. 28 p. 221/ Finally, on 4 February,
Mikoyan arrived to open the exhibition. Nine days later he
signed a trade agreement with the Cuban government. The
USSR undertook to buy 425 thousand tons of sugar in 1960,
and a million tons per year in the following four years.
Further, the agreement provided for a Soviet credit to Cuba
of $100 million for the purchase of plants, machinery,
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materials, and technical assistance. A communique was
issued which announced that both nations would soon discuss
the resumption of diplomatic relations, which had been
broken off by Batista after his successful coup in March
1952. /Ref. 45 p. 84/
Even before Mikoyan had left Cuba, a delegation arrived
from East Germany. In February, 1960, this delegation
signed a financial and commercial agreement with Cuba.
This was followed at the end of March by a similar agree-
ment with Poland, thus showing that the establishment of
ties with Cuba was now a general policy of the socialist
camp, or at least of its European members. /Ret. 45 p. 85/
Following his assurance of backing from the Soviet
Union
—
perhaps it was in exchange for such backing— the
Castro regime unleashed a series of attacks upon the United
States of unprecedented bitterness and fury. On 3 March,
Guevara labeled the $150 million annual subsidy the U.S.
extended for Cuban sugar, "a form of economic enslavement."
On 6 March, the French ship LE COUBRE, carrying seventy-
six tons of ammunition purchased in Belgium, exploded at
the dock in Havana. It was assumed to be a case of sabotage
and blame was promptly directed towards the U.S. On 9-10
March, Castro questioned the U.S. jurisdictional rights
over Guantanamo Bay naval base. /Ref. 29 p. 280/ On 18
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March, Yugoslavia signed a commercial agreement with Cuba.
It was the second socialist state to do so. On the same
day, Castro, who was having trouble purchasing a helicopter
from the U.S., was presented one as a gift from the USSR.
/Ref. 22 p. 777
It was announced on 25 March that a total of 130,000
tons of sugar were sold to China, thereby in effect in-
augurating trade relations with Peking. On 1 April, the
signing of a commercial agreement with Poland was announced,
and on 3 April, the New York Times reported that the U.S.
might cut off economic aid to Poland because of the agree-
ment. /Ref. 22 p. 72/
On 6 April, the Havana press revealed that 155,000 acres
belonging to the United Fruit Company had been expropriated,
with an offer of compensation of $3.8 million in "agrarian
*
reform" government bonds. (This was the first significant
chunk of American property to be affected by the agrarian
reform of 17 May of the previous year.) /Ref. 18 p. 115/
The secretary-general of the Chinese trade unions and a
sizable delegation arrived in Havana from China on 22 April.
On the same day a commercial agreement was signed with Japan,
an old customer, calling for the sale of 500,000 tons of
Cuban sugar over a three-year period, and for the first time,
* The amount never reached the bargaining stage, and there
is no record that any agrarian reform bonds were ever printed,
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the purchase of a sizable quantity of Japanese textiles
among other items. American textile exporters were repor-
tedly alarmed. The next day Castro announced that Cuba's
foreign exchange reserves had risen from $78 million in
January 1959 to $142 million. He was in a state of un-
abashed euphoria as he lashed out once more against American
plans for aggression. /Ref. 22 p. 11/
On 7 May I960, diplomatic relations between Cuba and
the USSR were formally reestablished.
On 8 June, Khrushchev told a visiting Cuban official
that the Soviet Union did not need missile bases in Cuba
because "by pressing a button we can hit any spot on earth.
"
This was followed on 9 July, by Khrushchev's first and often
repeated public statement that, "figuratively speaking,
"
the Soviet Union would flatten the U.S. with atomic missiles
if Cuba were attacked. Of course, this statement was taken
as "literally speaking" by the Cuban people, thereby
enormously boosting their confidence in the wisdom of
Fidel's foreign policy. /Ref. 22 p. 78/
By late June, Raul Castro began reporting success in
his arms-purchasing mission behind the iron curtain. This
was the last straw and it brought an end to the eighteen
month "policy of patience" of the Eisenhower administration.
The repeated offers (twenty-five of them) to negotiate all
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outstanding differences with Cuba had gotten nowhere. This
fact, coupled with the apparently willing drift of the
Castro regime into the Soviet camp, obviously called for
a drastic change of policy. /Ref. 29 p. 280/
It took another six months before the break between
Cuba and the U.S. was complete, but the trend toward
rupture was unmistakable in the summer of 1960. Highlights
of a month-long crisis were: (1) June 22—President
Eisenhower ' s request to Congress for authority to cut the
Cuban sugar quota; (2) June 23—Castro's warning that he
would retaliate by seizing all remaining U.S. holdings;
(3) June 29—U.S. denunciation of Cuban slander before the
OAS Peace Committee, and Cuban takeover of the Texaco oil
refinery; (4) July 1—seizure of standard Oil of New Jersey's
Cuba refinery; (5) July 5—U.S. suspension of all Cuban
sugar imports; (G) July 9—Khrushchev's declaration that the
USSR would use rockets to halt military intervention in
Cuba; (7) July 10—Eisenhower's statement that he would not
tolerate a regime dominated by international Communism in
the Western Hemisphere; (8) July 12—Khrushchev's pronounce-
ment that the Monroe Doctrine "is dead"; (9) July 13
—
Communist China's trade-pact negotiations with Cuba; (10)
July 18—Cuba's charge of U.S. invasion plans before the
UN; (11) July 21--new Soviet pledges of military and
economic support for Cuba. /Ref. 29 P. 281/
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By August, the schism between Washington and Havana was
so deep and the Cuban commitments to the Soviet bloc so
broad that there could be no turning back. Charges and
countercharges were exchanged before the UN in August and
before the OAS in September. On October 19, the U.S. im-
posed an embargo on all exports to Cuba save food and
medicine. By the end of the year Castro was hurriedly
mobilizing the country in an anticipation of an invasion.
/Ref. 29 p. 281/ On 3 January 1961, following Castro's
demand that the United States reduce its embassy staff in
Havana to eleven, the Eisenhower administration severed
diplomatic relations.
By this time, Cuba had gone nearly all the way in the
process of conversion into a Soviet satellite state. Al-
though not subject to the same degree of ultimate control
that Moscow held over the satellites of Eastern Europe, it
nevertheless followed the Soviet line in both domestic and
foreign policy. Trade pacts had been made with nine Soviet-
bloc nations, and the island was swarming with Soviet tech-
nicians. Soviet arms (including tanks and planes) had made
Cuba, though no direct threat to the U.S., a military power
to be reckoned with in Latin America. /Ref. 18 p. 120/
Cuba now possessed nearly all the features that character-
ized Communist states everywhere: a small, tightly organized
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group ruling in the name of the "dictatorship of the pro-
letariat, " with complete absence of civil liberties and
political freedom; state control and operation of commerce
and industry and of workers' organizations; and an anti-
American pro-Soviet line in foreign policy. By the end
of 1960 the last Cuban stronghold of opposition to Commu-
nism, the Roman Catholic Church, was relentlessly and
systematically being silenced. /Ref. 29 p. 282/
In summary then, we see that the initial Soviet attitude
was somewhat ambivalent towards Cuba in 1959. This relation-
ship was tightened through increased economic negotiations
and agreements with the socialist countries into early
1960, culminating in reestablishment of diplomatic relations
in May of that year. A near reversal of this situation
transpired between the U.S. and Cuba during this same period.
Increased political friction along with continuous corporate
expropriations finally resulted in severence of diplomatic
relations in early 1961.
3. U.S. Reaction
Meanwhile, American agencies had begun to support
clandestinely, in collusion with the governments of
Guatemala and Nicaragua, the training and equipping of
Cuban exile groups in preparation of a projected assult on
the Castro regime. When the Kennedy administration
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assumed office in January of 1961, it continued the prep-
arations for an armed landing of anti-Castro forces in
Cuba, ruling out any participation by U.S. forces in the
fighting. /Ref. 29 p. 285/
In the third week of April the invasion took place on
the southern coast of Cuba. In a very few days the in-
vaders, about fifteen hundred strong, were utterly crushed
by Castro's far superior military might. Not only was the
whole operation an incredible military fiasco, but it was
also a flagrant violation of the non-intervention prin-
ciple to which the U.S. had repeatedly subscribed in var-
ious inter-American declarations and treaties. /Ref. 29
p. 285_/ The participation of the U.S. was too limited to
assure success but quite significant enough to make it
impossible to refute the charge of intervention.
4 . Castro's Marxist-Leninist Declaration
Generally, the year 1961 was not very favorable for
Castro in Latin America. It is true that victory over the
invasion forces in April considerably heightened his in-
fluence on the continent, but the ratification of the
Alliance for Progress in August gave the U.S. government
an effective means with which to persuade the Latin
American governments to close ranks against Castroism.
/Ref. 45 p. 138/
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At the end of 1961, Castro faced a situation in which
Cuba's admission to the socialist bloc was denied, the
economic help given to Cuba was insufficient, conditions
in Latin America were not particularly favorable for rev-
olution, and the Communist "old guard, " in spite of their
internal differences, thought they were about to control
the "backbone of the state." Castro once more decided to
trust his luck and his audacity. /Ref . 18 p. 125/
In a television appearance on 1 December 1961, he dis-
closed that he had always intuitively been a Marxist-Leninist,
pledged that he would continue to be one until he died, and
tried to dispel any doubts or reservations that might re-
main concerning his real ideological position. This, he
evidently did to overcome the resistance of the socialist
bloc, to establish himself as the leader of the Communist
movement in Latin America, to maintain the initiative
against the U.S., and incidently, to obtain from the Soviet
bloc the consumer goods he needed so desperately. /Ref.45
p. 141/
Given the objectives we have imputed to Castro's speech,
it appears to be a masterpiece. It proved, however, to be
one of his most unfortunate public appearances. In Cuba
his words were received with amazement. The international
press misinterpreted them, reducing the whole speech to an
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account of a monstrous hoax perpetrated on the Cuban people
from an early date—a date that each commentator fixed arbi-
trarily for his own convenience. /Ref. 45 p. 143/
What was even worse for Castro was that his confession
of faith did not have any effect on the attitude of the
members of the Socialist bloc. On the fourth anniversary
of the triumph of the Cuban revolution, Brezhnev and
Khrushchev wished him only "success in the creation of a
new society." Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai predicted
victories "in the cause of the revolution and of construc-
tion, " and even little Albania limited herself to congrat-
ulations on his efforts to "build a free life." Not a
word about his "socialism. " To top it off, a new round
with the Soviets in the trade negotiations for 1962 ended
at the beginning of January with no appreciable result.
/Ref. 45 p. 143/
In a response to the OAS agreement of 31 January 1962
by which Cuba was suspended from the inter-American organ-
ization, Castro proclaimed the Second Declaration of Havana,
in which the growing differences between the Soviets and
the Cuban leader were made even more evident. The same man
who only two months before had recommended to all, the
reading of Khrushchev reports to the CPSU, now failed to




"peaceful transition, " or any of the other recommended
Soviet formulas for the zones of the "third world" in his
words to the peoples of Latin America. ^/Ref. 45 p. 145/
Briefly then, relations between Cuba and the two great
powers of the socialist bloc remained unchanged. That is,
toward the first anniversary of Castro's declaration on
16 April 1961, his "socialism" had not been officially
recognized; the commercial agreements for 1962 with both
countries had not been signed; and there were grave differ-
ences of opinion with the Soviet Union on such matters as
general strategy and the extent of the protection that the
Soviets should give to Cuba.
On 3 July 1962, it was announced that Raul Castro,
accompanied by a delegation of Cuban army officers, was
in Moscow, and had been received by Marshal Malinovsky,
the Soviet Minister of Defense. All this obviously meant
that the double crisis of Cuban-Soviet relations and of
Castro's relations with the "old" Communists had been
overcome. Some form of agreement must have been reached
shortly before June 25, the day on which the atmosphere
suddenly cleared. It is perhaps correct to assume that the
decision to station missiles in Cuba formed part of the
agreement, since Raul's appearance in Moscow in the first
days of July was obviously connected with the decision.
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We may further surmise that the terms of the agreement in-
cluded acceptance of Castro as the supreme representative
of Marxism-Leninism in Cuba and the relegation of their own
agents, the "old Communists," to a secondary role. ^/Ref. 45
p. 1607
C. SOVIET-CUBAN DIFFERENCES
1. The Aftermath of The Missile Crisis
By mid-1962 Cuba had been suspended from the OAS ; the
majority of Latin American countries had broken diplomatic
relations with Castro; his internal situation was deterior-
ating, and the prospects for a revolutionary movement on
the continent were highly doubtful. At such a time it is
futile to conjecture whether defensive considerations—the
defense of the Cuban base, or offensive ones— to step up
revolutionary activities on the continent, were decisive
for him. /Ret. 45 p. 16_3/
The Missile Crisis, on the other hand, was a humili-
ation for which the Russians will never be forgiven. For
the first, and thus far only time in his career, Fidel
Castro allowed the power of decision to lie in other hands.
What was worse, it lay in Russian, which is to say, in
foreign hands. /Ref. 32 p. 200/
On the face of it, he seemed to be acting as a stooge of
Moscow, introducing Communist power as well as Communist
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ideology into the Western Hemisphere. What he did was
recognized as an act of inexcusable recklessness. Although
Cuba and the Soviet Union were, in fact, following the same
policy for different reasons in the missile adventure, and
although Castro did not in the least consider himself as a
tool of Moscow, appearances were against him. /Ref. 32 p. 23^1/
The fact that the crisis was settled between Kennedy and
Khrushchev, without Castro's being consulted at any stage,
was a humiliation which demonstrated Fidel's and Cuba's
weakness. In international terms, this was the lowest point
that Fidel reached in his revolution. He knew it, and the
knowledge rankled him. /Ref. 32 p. 232/
Castro had put forth an image of "machismo" to the
entire world with his expertise in "handling" the U.S.
previously, but this time the U.S. had taken a hard stand
on the matter of the missiles. To be sure, Castro finally
acquiesced but he had rejected the proposals for inter-
national inspection on Cuban soil of the dismantled missile
bases, though he stated that it was the right of the
Soviets to remove what was theirs from Cuban soil. He
also had no objections to the removal of the Russian
bombers since they too, were Soviet property; however, he
was hardly pleased with the removal and accused the U.S.
of trying to maintain tensions and prolong the crisis while
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continuing its policy of force. As a result of all of
this, Cuban-Soviet relations were so strained that Mikoyan
was forced to return to Cuba in an effort to restore har-
mony. /Ref. 1 p. 215/
In defense of Cuba, the Chinese Communists criticized
the Soviet action in the missile situation as a retreat
from U.S. imperialism. With Castro siding with the
Chinese, the Soviets were hard-pressed to maintain tran-
quility in the "family" and .eventually Khrushchev was
forced publicly to declare China an opponent of his efforts
to prevent nuclear war. /Ref. 45 p. 172/
2 . The Sino-Soviet Rift
Not fully satisfied with either Moscow or Peking, the
Cuban leadership was unwilling to support either govern-
ment in the momentous dispute that began to unfold pub-
licly between them. Although Cuba officiallly entered the
Soviet orbit in the spring of 1963, on some issues the
Cubans still seemed to side with the Chinese, thus further
inhibiting the development of smoother relations between
Moscow and Havana. For the most part, however, in 1963
and 1964 they remained neutral in their response to the
Sino-Soviet dispute. /Ref. 51 p. 44JL/
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Reflecting upon Cuban dependence on the USSR, Soviet
trade/aid accounted for about forty-five percent of Cuba's
total trade from 1961-1964; China's share amounted to ten
percent during the same period. Given Cuba's critical
economic situation along with apparent Soviet reluctance
to support the continuing Revolution, Cuba had no desire to
antagonize the Chinese. But interest in Chinese friendship
is not meant to imply that Cuba was growing closer to China
during the 1961-64 period, since dealings with the Soviet
bloc were generally more prominent during this time frame.
In fact, the Cubans sided with Peking rather than Moscow
only on the nuclear test ban treaty and the spread of
revolution. /Ref. 51 p. 441/
It was not until after the fall of Khrushchev that
Cuba slowly eased away from the Chinese way of thinking
and back toward the Soviet fold. In late 1964, a conference
of the Communist Parties of Latin America was held in Havana
during which the Cuban Revolution and armed struggles were
the main issues of discussion. The positions which the con-
ference eventually adopted, represented agreement with Soviet
policy at the expense of the Chinese. Cuba was willing to
concur with the Soviet stand because of the official commun-
ique's praise and support of the Cuban Revolution and of the
armed struggles proceeding on the Latin American continent.
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Although the Communist Parties in attendance did not
promise to follow the Cubans on all issues, the meeting
nevertheless, gave a new standing and legitimacy within
the Communist movement to the Cuban leadership and party
organization. /Ret. 51 p. 441/
Concurrent with the sharp increase in Soviet-Cuban
interaction, there was a striking decline in Chinese
approval of the Castro regime and its external policies.
By the end of 1964 Sino-Cuban relations had already reached
their apogee; in early 1965 a waning of mutual attraction
began and this continued through 1966, during which time
the Chinese perceived that the Cubans were no longer
neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Chinese criticized
the Cuban position on this matter and alleged Cuban com-
promise on the issue of aid to armed revolutions.
As if to re-establish Cuba's revolutionary credentials,
Havana played host in January 1966 to the Tri-Continental
Conference of Communist delegations meeting to promote the
coordination of "national liberation wars." The Soviets
were again attacked by Castro as he called for armed up-
risings around the world. Castro was using the congress
strictly as a means of promoting his guerrilla warfare
position. The Soviets found that they were unable to
control the Castro attack and quickly disassociated
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themselves from the entire affair. /Ref. 42 p. 1142/ From
that time on until 1968 the Soviet-Cuban relationship
worsened.
In retrospect, the USSR's relations with Cuba after
1964 illustrate tempered conservatism in dealing with a
revolutionary state. The Soviets applied both economic
and diplomatic pressure on Cuba as a means of bringing
Castro more into consonance with their new orientations
toward Latin America. Moscow tempered this pressure with
selected words of praise. It pledged continued solidarity
with Cuba in April 1968, honored the anniversary of "Che"
Guevara's death in June, and extolled Soviet-Cuban econo-
mic cooperation in July. /Ref. 14, p. 659/
D. SOVIET-CUBAN REALIGNMENT
1. Castro Experiences Internal Difficulties
Throughout the 1960 's Castro had remained adamant in
his attitudes of an independent Cuba and the export of
revolution as the means of changing government. By 1968
he found himself in the untenable position of having failed
to achieve either goal. As a result of poor planning and
organization by the Fidelistas, Castro faced severe econo-
mic and social strains. Partly as a result of a drought
in eastern Cuba, the 1968 sugar harvest by mid-March was
almost a million tons below the 1967 comparable harvest,
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and far off the eight-million-ton goal set for the year.
Moreover/ a number of social problems—closely tied to
economic difficulties—were plaguing Cuba. /Ref. 14 p. 66J3/
The Russians were quick to point all this out and press for
a more organized and efficient operation. The impact of
Che Guevara's death in 1967 rounded out the failure issue.
Although Castro had continued to advocate guerrilla warfare
with promises of support, no guerrilla undertakings in
Latin America had been successful.
Solid evidence of a Soviet-Cuban rapprochement developed
after Havana declared its support of Moscow's August 1968
Czechoslovakian invasion policy. In addition to praising
their "fraternal friendship, " both countries demonstrated
the new sense of accord in 1969 through formation of a
Cuban-Soviet Friendship Association in April, a visit of
seven Soviet warships to Havana to help commemorate the
26th of July, and a well-publicized one day of work in the
cane fields by 650 Soviet technicians and diplomats in
November. /Ref.. 14 p. 66_1/ Also in November, Defense
Minister Grechko visited Havana amid much fanfare. As was
written in the Summer 1971 issue of Orbis , there was much
evidence of the new phase in Cuban-Soviet relations:
"...major speeches during 1969 relegated acknowledged
problems between Moscow and Havana to the past."
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"...a defector from Castro's intelligence network
reported in July 1969 that Castro had signed an
accord with Moscow in 1968 committing himself to
a pro-Moscow line, in return for which the Soviet
Union agreed not to diminish its economic support
to Cuba and would supply 5,000 technicians to work
in Cuba's faltering economy. If this report is
accurate, it would help to explain the new phase."
"...certain party events in Cuba suggest a response
to Moscow's renewed emphasis on orthodoxy and con-
servatism in its approach to revolutionary states.
Castro and other members of the PCC ' s Central Com-
mittee, such as Armando Hart Devalos, began in 1969
to urge the necessity of strengthening the party
and its mass organization at all levels. They ex-
plicitly referred, in some cases, to the Soviet ex-
perience as the example." ^/Ref. 14 p. 662-663/
In sum, Castro had moderated his tone, and more im-
portantly, had ceased his attacks against both the Soviets
and the orthodox parties. Whether the seeds of rivalry and
discord between the Cubans and their Soviet mentors still
remain below the surface, they will only be revealed through
observation and analysis of past, current, and future
attitudinal and behavioral expressions between the two
countries. Meanwhile, Moscow can take some satisfaction in
the fact, that while the New Left continues to fragment in
Latin America, dissonances within the orthodox Communist
movement have been largely muted and the Cubans are more
or less in line. /Ref. 42 p. 114J3/
2. The 1970 Sugar Harvest Failure
By 1970 the domestic situation had grown uneasy. With-
in the economic community there was worker apathy, shoddy
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work, lack of discipline, low labor productivity and
wide-spread disorganization. To bolster morale and re-
juvenate the depressed economy an all-out drive for a 10
million ton sugar harvest in 1970 was launched. There was
high risk of failure but the yield would be over $650
million, under the 1964 Soviet-Cuban Trade Agreement and it
would also provide Cuba with much needed foreign exchange
earnings on the world market. This, too, was advantageous
for Castro, for it would lessen the dependence of Cuba on
the Soviets. Throwing everything into the effort Castro
used the harvest as the "decisive test" to prove the func-
tionality of his radical style of leadership and of Fidelismo
itself.
Long before the harvest was in, it was apparent the goal
would not be reached. The reasons were obvious; insufficient
cane acreage, a lower than expected sugar cane yield and un-
expected problems with the sugar mills were the main ob-
stacles. As early as May 20, Castro had to acknowledge
publicly that their goal would not be reached and reassigned
an immediate goal of an 8.5 to 9.0 million ton harvest.
Although the final outcome was a record 8,535 million tons,
nearly double that of the previous year (4.459 million tons)
,
it was a limited victory and a costly venture. It was ex-
tremely detrimental to Fidel Castro, for it was his first
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major domestic political defeat. He had performed well but
had been unable to deliver on his commitments. Publicly
confessing his "responsibility" and "ignorance" in bringing
on Cuba's economic difficulties, Castro opened the door for
a Soviet thrust at the Fidelista regime for domestic, polit-
ical and economic reforms. /Ref. 18 p. 210-213/
E. PRESENT SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS
During the 1970' s there have still been some disagree-
ments by the two countries, but they have remained low key.
The Soviet bloc continues to provide extensive economic
support to Cuba while the USSR continues to pledge military
backing should the need arise. During the previously men-
tioned visit to Cuba, Soviet Communist Party Chief, Leonid
Brezhnev lauded the Cuban Revolution as the inspiration
for "all oppressed countries of the world, " while adding
that Communism was embarked on a quest for peace. "The
Soviet weapons in the hands of Cubans are not for attacking
anyone, " he stated, "They serve the cause of peace and
tranquility, " /Ret. 21, p. 4/ The Brezhnev visit is con-
sidered as the turning point in the history of the Cuban
Revolution for it trumpets almost total realignment of the
Castro regime with Soviet policy. Castro has further ex-
pressed a readiness and desire to establish diplomatic re-
lations with any country that has a foreign policy independent
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from that of the U.S. The full import of the Brezhnev visit
to Cuba is as yet unknown, but it is felt to be an appli-
cation of pressure for Castro to seek a solution to the Cuban-
U.S. impasse. /Ref.. 21 p. 8/
F. CUBA IN THE FUTURE
The Castro regime will continue for some time to be a
burr under the blanket, but Castro is mellowing as the ec-
onomics of the world become more obvious to him. The
Soviets are in no position other than to support, for they
do not believe in deserting an ally once joined, and to
desert Cuba would be to admit defeat for the first time in
their ideological undertakings. The Soviets obviously
would like to see a formation of Cuban-U.S. friendly re-
lations, because, with the U.S. back in the picture they
would be less responsible for Cuban survival. While the
USSR does not intend to lose Cuba, they realize how ex-
pensive it is to them, since they are pouring $600 million
per year into Cuba and gaining little political, economic
or military benefits from it; they have learned a lesson
from that.
The history of Soviet-Cuban relations since the early
1960's also warns of the anti-Soviet knife edge that Latin
American nationalism can develop. Moscow is well aware of
this essential lesson and shows no enthusiasm for supporting
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another Cuba, led by a volatile, charismatic, and often un-
predictable leader. Personalismo
, Machismo , and Caudillismo
can operate against the Soviets just as they have against
the U.S. Similarly, sensitivity to intervention can be
directed eastward while continuing to be aimed northward.
/Ref. 14 p. 6697
G. CONSIDERATIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RAMIFICATIONS
OF THIS RELATIONSHIP
Since Chapter One addressed the dilemma which Castro
presented to U.S. and Latin American Cuban policy, it is
only appropriate to make several parallel, but tentative
,
observations relevant to Soviet policy in this area. It is
important to understand the tentativeness of any proposed
conclusions at this point since a major facet of this re-
search was to contribute to our knowledge of this relation-
ship, and thus aid us in determining future direction of
Soviet policy in Latin America.
Cuba's insularity and location, some 6000 nautical
miles from its major protector and provider are obvious.
What is not so obvious is the fact that the island is
indefensible, from the Kremlin's point of view, i.e., the
U.S. and OAS can take a range of conventional military
actions against Cuba, to which Moscow could not hope to
*Personalismo - importance of personalities
Machismo - male virility
Caudillismo - strong-man rule
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respond successfully and locally at any conventional levels
of conflict. In effect, Cuba represents one global commit-
ment that the USSR cannot defend locally. /Ref. 56 p.. 50J5/
The second factor in the Soviet dilemma is the U.S. and
OAS policy toward the Soviet-Cuban relationship. This has
evolved as a result of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban
Missile Crisis, the Dominican Crisis, the Cienfuegos Con-
frontation, and the recurring endeavors of the Castro
regime to spread militant revolution in Latin America.
/Ref. 56 p. 505/
From these events, three tenets of U.S. and OAS policy
have evolved. The first is the economic and diplomatic
isolation of Cuba within the Western Hemisphere. Another
tenet is the use of force to oppose any threat from Cuba
or from outside the Western Hemisphere against any Latin
American state. (Evidence of this was demonstrated during
the 1965 Dominican crisis when the U.S. and the OAS dis-
patched troops to Santa Domingo.) The third tenet of U.S.
and OAS policy relates to the ban on offensive weapons
introduction into Cuba. /Ref. 56 p. 506/
In addition to geography and U.S. and OAS policy, the
client nature of Cuba's economy bears on the Soviet dilemma.
The island's dependent economy tends to restrict the regime's
foreign alignments to one country—the USSR. In other words,
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Cuba has very little capability to influence international
events. /Ref. 56 p. 507/ Castro can use the island as a
base for propaganda efforts and can provide some limited
support to Latin American insurgencies. However, it is
difficult to see how any Communist regime in Cuba could
survive, without continuous Soviet aid, for more than a
few months under the embargo conditions imposed by the OAS.
Now that Cuba has become a virtual "satellite" of the
Soviet Union, there are many who see this only as the first
step in a Soviet conspiracy to make future probes throughout
Latin America. The prevailing sentiment in some quarters
seems to be that for a state to open diplomatic relations
with Moscow is to take the first step toward Communism. It
has been further suggested that this "thrusting out" on
Moscow's part is so aggressive that it might cast doubts on
the future of U.S. -Soviet detente policies. Author, Wayne
Smith, in his article "Soviet Policy and Ideological Formu-
lations for Latin America", draws more realistic conclusions
(to me) which are at odds with these views. He believes that
the primary Soviet objective is not to "communize" Latin
America, but to undercut U.S. influence in the area. He
sees Moscow's efforts to achieve this goal as being essen-
tially cautious and opportunistic. The Soviets prudently
seek to take advantage of unrest and growing anti-Americanism,
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but they do not create these conditions. They have little
capacity to do so. He goes on to say that Soviet efforts
are not likely to play a significant role in determining
the outcome of events in Latin America. The Soviet presence
may at times become a complicating factor in U.S. -Latin
American relations and occasionally even an irritant in U.S.-
Soviet relations; but in both cases it is apt to remain some-
thing of a side issue. /Ref. 42 p. 1123V The central issue
in the hemisphere, then, is and will be the future of U.S.-
Latin American relations vice Soviet-Latin American relations
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III. NATURE OF THE CURRENT PROBLEM
On 12 November 1974 in Quito, Ecuador, hemispheric
foreign ministers defeated an effort to lift the Organi-
zation of American States' 1964 economic and political
sanctions against Cuba by a vote of 12 to 3, with six
nations abstaining. The proposal had been sponsored by
Venezuela, Costa Rico and Columbia.
Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay came to Quito committed to
opposing repeal of the embargo. Nicaragua, Brazil and the
United States announced early in the meeting that they
would abstain. Cuba's supporters kept saying they were
sure of victory, until Haiti and Guatemala announced they
also would abstain because they felt Castro was still
meddling in the domestic affairs of his neighbors.
The fact that such a meeting occurred can be said to
represent a significant foreign policy positional change
on the part of the OAS membership since 1964; but more
importantly, its occurrence is a direct result of perceived
changes of Havana's attitude and behavior by the leadership
of the member countries.
Up to this point all previous discussion has been
focused on the conditions and ramifications of rapproche-
ment as it affected the U.S., the USSR, and the other Latin
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American countries. However, the perceptions, attitudes
and exhibited behavior of Cuba toward these other key
actors has not been addressed. Has there in fact been a
change of attitudes and behavior on the part of the Cuban
leadership? The thrust of the remaining portion of this
research was to determine if in fact, such a measurable
change has occurred from 1970 to the present.
Before proceeding, it is appropriate to focus on how
attitude and behavior change have traditionally been con-
ceptualized and related. Attitudes have generally been
regarded as either mental readiness or implicit predispo-
sitions which exert some general and consistent influence
on a fairly large class of evaluative responses. These
responses are usually directed toward some object, person,
group or nation in this case. In addition, attitudes are
seen as enduring predispositions, but ones which are
learned rather than innate. Therefore, even though at-
titudes are not momentarily transient , they are susceptible
to change. ^Ref. 58 p. 6/
What are the crucial components of this conceptuali-
zation of attitudes, and how are these components relevant
to any practical problem? Thinking of attitudes as under-
lying learned predispositions suggests that all the tech-
niques which are known to increase or decrease learning
should be applicable to producing change in attitudes.
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For instance, rewards and punishments should be highly
effective means of producing attitude change, and it should
be possible to use them to predict the amount of general-
ized attitude change that will occur. In essence, all the
techniques relevant to learning any materials should be
relevent to learning and changing attitudes /Ref. 58 p. 7/
Merely defining attitudes as enduring, general, and
learned tells us little about how to measure or change
them. In fact, defining attitudes in this way only implies
that they are states which exist inside an entity and which
exert some control over its overt behavior. How they exert
control is left ambiguous. Therefore, to solve these
problems, attitudes have generally been divided into three
components: affect, cognition, and behavior. The affect-
ive component consists of an evaluation of, liking of, or
emotional response to some object, person or nation. The
cognitive component has been conceptualized as the beliefs
about, or factual knowledge of, the object, person, or
nation. The behavioral component involves the overt be-
havior directed toward the object, person or nation. It
should be remembered that the purpose of this research was
not to determine by what means Cuba's attitudes towards
other nations were formed, manipulated or changed, but it
was to periodically measure such attitude alterations.
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This three component conception provides us with ideas about
how to measure them. The affective component could be meas-
ured by physiological responses or verbal statements of like
and dislike, while the cognitive component might be meas-
ured by self-ratings or subjective ratings of beliefs or
the amount of knowledge which an entity has about some
topic. The behavioral component could be measured by
direct observation of how an entity behaves in specific
stimulus situations. /Ref. 58 p. 7-8/
Up to now, we have implicitly assumed that attitudes
are generalized predispositions to behave in various ways.
It follows from this conception that changes in these
predispositions should be eventually followed by corres-
ponding changes in behavior. Unfortunately, research
relevant to this topic has indicated that such a conclusion
is frequently false; changes in attitudes are not neces-
sarily accompanied by changes in behavior. /Ret. 58 p. 8J5/
While the intent of this research problem was not to analyze
those intervening variables that may cause such a phenomena
to occur or not occur, it is important to be aware of their
presence. Briefly they may be categorized as expected role
sanctions and habits, capability and behavioral intentions
to act in a specific manner, and expected consequences of
a given behavior. In other words, given a stimulus-response
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type situation, allowance for these factors must be made
before any response can be anticipated or projected.
This research problem was to measure Cuba's attitud -
inal (affective, cognitive, behavioral) view of the world
over the past four and one-half years to determine if such
view has been significantly altered or changed; and,
whether or not such change or lack thereof was subsequently
verified or substantiated by its actual overt behavior with
respect to the other world countries, esp. the U.S., USSR,





At this point in the research my objective is to deter-
mine how Cuba envisions the other world countries in terms
of their expressed view of those countries, and to compare
and contrast these attitudinal views with their actual
overt behavior over the same time frame.
All communications which emanate from Cuba, such as
broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers and
periodicals, were assumed to be products of their owner/
operator, the Cuban government. It was further assumed
that since this was the case, these communications accur-
ately reflected/represented/inferred the values, attitudes,
motives, intentions and concerns of that government. Tech-
nically stated, "the important aspects of communications
are what is revealed by the lexical items present in it;
words are assumed to 'represent' accurately the communi-
cators' inner feelings, and through 'Content Analysis' of
these communications, constant, though probabilistic,
relationships between the content of communications and
the underlying motives of the author can be measured."
/Ref. 23, p. 327
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The source used for making this determination was a
random sample of the Daily Report Contents for Cuba, of
the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service Latin
America (FBIS) . Data was collected from April 1970 through
September 1974.
Through utilization of the World Event Interaction
Survey (WEIS) , data relating to Cuba's real world behavior
was compiled for the same time period. The source this
data was extracted from the weekly journal, Latin Amer ica,
and coded in accordance with current WEIS procedures.
In essence, then, the intent was to measure through
Content Analysis, the attitudinal world view of the Cuban
government in relation to foreign affairs, and to contrast
and compare this data with Cuba's real world foreign affairs
interactions (WEIS) over the same time frame.
B. CONTENT ANALYSIS
1. Kov; it Works !
Content analysis is a multipurpose research method
developed specifically for investigating any problem in
which the content of communication serves as the basis of
inference. /Ref. 23 p. 2/ This is but one of the numerous
definitions of content analysis which could have been em-
ployed in introducing this basic research tool. Despite
their diversity, definitions of content analysis reveal
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broad agreement on the requirements of objectivity, system,
and generality. Objectivity stipulates that each step in
the research process must be carried out on the basis of
explicitly formulated rules and procedures. Even the
simplest and most mechanical forms of content analysis re-
quire the investigator to use his judgement in making de-
cisions about his data. Objectivity implies that these
decisions are guided by an explicit set of rules that
minimize—although probably never quite eliminate—the
possibility that the findings reflect the analyst's sub-
jective predispositions rather than the content of the
documents under analysis. Systematic means the inclusion
and exclusion of content or categories is done according
to consistently applied rules. This requirement clearly
eliminates analysis in which only materials supporting
the investigator's hypothesis are admitted as evidence.
It also implies that categories are defined in a manner
which permit them to be used according to consistently
applied rules. Generality requires that the findings
must have theoretical relevance. Purely descriptive in-
formation about content, unrelated to other attributes
of documents or to the characteristics of the sender or
recipient of the message, is of little value. /Ref. 23
p. 3/ Stated somewhat differently, "a datum about a
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communication content is meaningless until it is related to
at least one other datum." /Ref. 23 p. 5/ The link between
these is represented by some form of theory. Thus all con-
tent analysis is concerned with comparison, the type of com-
parison being dictated by the investigator's theory. At
this point we can now present a more refined definition of
content analysis which will serve as a basis for this re-
search project. Content analysis is any technique for making
inferences by objectively and systematically identifying
specified characteristics of messages.
All communication is composed of six basic elements: _a
source or sender , an encoding process which results in a
message , a channel of transmission, a detector or recipient
of the message, and a decoding process . /Ref . 23 p. 24/
The investigator may analyze messages to make inferences
about the characteristics of text, the causes or antecedents
of messages, or the effects of communication. Content
analysis is used most frequently to describe the attributes
of messages or "what" question, without reference to either
intentions (encoding process) of the sender or the effect of
the message upon those to whom it is directed (decoding pro-
cess) . Much of the research has addressed itself to some
variety of the "what?" question, testing hypothesis about such
matters as focus of attention, trends in communication, or
cross-media difference. /Ref. 23 p. 28/
79

The analyst may compare documents derived from a single
source in several ways. One application of this method is
the comparison of messages over time, from which the analyst
may draw inferences about secular trends. This is one of
the most frequently used forms of content analysis. The
investigator may also compare messages from a single source
in differing situations. This is applicable for determining
the effect of changed circumstances on specified character-
istics of communications. Both of these approaches are
directly applicable to the present research and can be
graphically illustrated as follows:
Messages Produced Messages Produced
By Source A: By Source A:
Time tl Time t2




Messages Produced Messages Produced
By Source A: By Source A:
Situation si Situation s2
ATTITUDE A A
x








Another major classification of studies is that in which
the text is analyzed in order to make inferences about the
causes or antecedents of the message . In other words, what
are the values, attitudes, motives, intentions, or concerns
of the communicator that can be inferred from the message.
It was in these contexts that Content Analysis was of primary
interest to the current research project.
2 . Sampling and Reliability
The goal of content analysis research is to present a
systematic and objective description of the attributes of
communication. These data may be used to make inferences
about communicators or audiences. But whatever the specific
purpose of the study, there are certain problems which the
content analyst shares with all persons conducting systematic
inquiry. What is the universe of communication to be des-
cribed, and what sample is to be drawn therefrom? Do re-
peated measures with the same categories on a set of documents
yield stable and consistent results? That is, can the study
be replicated? Do the categories actually index the vari-
ables they are intended to measure? Careful attention to
these questions was an integral part of this research pro-





The sampling procedure was as follows: A random sample
of two issues per month of the forementioned content analysis
source document, U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Latin America (FBIS) , were selected over the period from
April 1970 through September 1974. It should be noted that
this random selection was remotely accomplished without any
direct communication or liaison between the researcher and
the sampler. The result of this was a sample of 108 days of
FBIS reports for the time frame of the research.
4. Reliability
If research is to satisfy the requirements of objec-
tivity, measures and procedures must be reliable; i.e.,
repeated measures with the same instrument on a given sample
of data should yield similar results. To meet these require-
ments the Content Analysis Coding Rules at the end of this
subsection were constructed and adhered to.
All coding was accomplished by the primary researcher
without necessity for outside coders. Nevertheless, in order
to comply with the above reliability requirements, all broad-
cast were coded three times at different time intervals.
Only minor discontinuities, discrepancies and inconsistencies
were found to exist between the three different occasions.
These were all remedied and accounted for to the satisfaction
of the researcher, without any adverse effect on the final results
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Although the researcher was the only coder in this in-
stance, it was still felt that the requirements of individual
reliability should be met. The purpose of such a test is to
reflect the extent of agreement between coders. This was
accomplished through administering an informal test to the
research advisor, and to another impartial coder. Both were
presented with a list of coding rules and a random sample of
broadcasts. Only minor discontinuities and inconsistencies
between these two coders and the researcher were found to
exist. These were primarily attributable to the outside
coders' non-familiarity with the research material and pro-
cedures. It was felt that should their coding services be
required under actual circumstances, these minor discrep-
ancies could be ameliorated with proper briefing, and
thorough understanding, familiarization, and usage of the
following Coding Rules.
5. Coding Procedures
The reported utterance or deed in some sense must "cross"
a national boundary. Ordinarily, the report will include a
recipient or "target" of the reported utterance. If the
broadcast reports upon or quotes individual's statements
about other countries, such individuals must be high level
official Cuban government and executive sources or that of an
executive agency of that government, (i.e., Ministry of
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Education, Armed Forces, Interior, etc.) Any reported state-
ments made by visiting foreign dignitaries and other persons
about various countries will be ignored. Also, all "non-
international" and domestic reports will be coded separately
under Special Categories to be explained later.
6. Coding Rules
COUNTRY AND WORLD ORGANIZATION APPROACH: The countries
of the world have been grouped into 14 distinct categories
and three world recognized organizations. They consist of
and are defined on the following extract from the coding
sheet.
USSR
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PORTUGAL NETHER. NORWAY U.S.
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FUNCTIONAL TARGET AREAS OF INTEREST: Since it is
likely that Cuba's broadcast area of interest may be incon-
sistent (i.e., they may verbally attack a country, while at
the same time be seeking economic aid from the same country)
it is necessary to be more specific by listing three Func-
tional Target Areas of Interest for each country—military,
(scientific, cultural, economic) S-C-E, and political.
MILITARY—The theme must directly state a reference to
the military establishment, forces, hardware, employments,
deployments, policies, etc. of a specified country.
EXAMPLE : "The U.S. imperialists further exhibited their
aggressive tendencies by deploying an aircraft
carrier to patrol in Cuban waters."
SCIENTIFIC, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC (S-C-E) —The theme
must directly refer to scientific, cultural or economic
events related to the specified nations. Economic
events are defined as follows:
a) economic policies, either internal or external,
b) trade relations with other nations,
c) nature of economic system (not meant to include
"imperialist" or "communist")
EXAMPLE : "Israeli aggressors are heavily dependent on the
U.S. capitalists for a large portion of their
oil supply". "The USSR has agreed to buy all
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the sugar that Cuba can produce in the next
year.
"
POLITICAL—The theme must directly relate to political
concepts of a specified nation or organization.
Broadcasts relating to the following are to be
included:
a) international agreements or political align-
ments,
b) participation in the political affairs of
another nation /
c) political events within the nation,
d) foreign policy/ not to include military or
economic concepts.
EXAMPLE ; "New Soviet Ambassador presents credentials to
President Dorticos.
"
"The unequal representation that North and
South Korea have in the U.N. is the direct
responsibility of the imperialist U.S.
Aggressors.
"
AREA OF INTEREST EVALUATION: Cuba's broadcasts relating
to various target areas of interest for the countries and




UNFAVORABLE—The theme must contain adjectives or wording
of a negative nature, directed at the specified country
or organization, in one or more of the three Functional
Target Areas of Interest. The theme must carry a neg-
ative comment at face value.
EXAMPLE : "Castro issued a communique condemning U.S.
imperialist aggression in Indochina and call-
ing on the peoples of the world to strengthen
their fighting solidarity with the peoples of
that peninsula."
NEUTRAL—The theme must contain a reference to one or
more of the three Functional Target Areas of Interest
for a country or organization, but there must be no
direct comment either in praise or in opposition to
the category.
EXAMPLE : "The British and the U.S. imperialists are
participating in ever closing economic re-
lations . "
FAVORABLE—The theme must include direct reference to
agreement of one or more of the Functional Target
Areas of Interest for a specified country or organi-
zation. The theme must carry at face value, a positive
comment on support of the category.
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EXAMPLE : "The Arab oil producing nations are justified
in carrying on the oil war with their imperial-
ist enemies .
"
7. Unit of Analysis
The theme will be the unit of analysis. Each broadcast
can contain only three different themes for each category.
For instance, a broadcast may contain either a favorable,
or unfavorable, or neutral political theme; and, either a
favorable, or unfavorable, or neutral scientific, cultural,
economic (S-C-E) theme; and, either a favorable, or unfavor-
able, or neutral military theme. If a broadcast contains
favorable, unfavorable and neutral themes for any of the
Functional Target Areas of Interest in a category, the coder
must decide on the one measurement of interest which is most
predominant.
8. Special Categories
Categories 18 through 25 will be referred to as special
categories of interest. Only the number of broadcasts which
meet the special category criteria (to be defined later) will
be logged in the appropriate space. It should be noted that
broadcasts which meet the criteria for an entry in category 1
through 17 may also contain references to categories 18
through 25, and may thus be concurrently logged. The follow-




NUMBER OF BRDCST. ADVERSE FAVORABLE NEUTRAL
18. USSR DEPENDENCE
19. RENEWED U.S.REL.
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DISPUTE BROADCAST
25. SPT. FOR OTHER




SPECIAL CATEGORY DEFINITIONS: USSR DEPENDENCE
—
Broad-
cast theme must make specific reference to present, past, or
future dependence of Cuba on the USSR. Themes will be logged
as adverse, favorable or neutral.
EXAMPLE ; "The only way the Cuban economy can free it-
self from our generous Soviet comrades is
through the toil of its citizens." NEUTRAL
RENEWED U.S. RELATIONS—Broadcast theme must make specific
reference to Cuban views on renewed political and econ-
omic relations with the United States. Themes will be
logged as adverse, favorable or neutral.
EXAMPLE : "Nothing that the Yankee aggressor would ever
do could influence free Cuba to assume its
previous slavelike status to that country.
"
ADVERSE
CUBA AS INSTRUMENT OF USSR—Only broadcasts which refer
to Cuba's being used as a military, political or economic
extension of Soviet influence in the western hemisphere,
will be logged in this category.
EXAMPLE : "The Soviet government and people will always
be able to depend on the Cuban people to pro-
ject and defend the ideals and principles of
Soviet Communism in Latin America." FAVORABLE
CHILE BROADCAST—Since there was an apparent change in
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alliance of this country during the research period,
it was necessarily treated as an outlier of the Latin
American countries. Viewing such a conclusion, it could
be treated as an ally of the USSR up to September 1973,
thereafter, as a typical Latin American country.
EXAMPLE : "The ideals expounded by the Allende govern-
ment represent those of a free people in a
free country." FAVORABLE
REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA—All broadcast themes which
refer to revolutionary activities in other Latin American
countries will be logged in this category. Themes will
be logged as promotes, opposes or neutral.
EXAMPLE ; "Party leader Castro has again offered to
supply arms and expertise to any Latin Amer-
ican country that chooses to overthrow the
Facist leaders and restore the reigns of
leadership to its rightful owner, the people.
"
PROMOTES
CUBA, DOMESTIC, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, EDUCATION, MILITARY
AND RELIGION—A large number of broadcast themes will
confine themselves to these topics without any foreign
target country being involved, i.e., broadcasts relating
to internal issues will be logged here. Themes will be
logged as self-critical, favorable/praising or neutral.
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EXAMPLE : "Premier Castro announced today that the total
tonnage figure for this year's sugar harvest
was being reduced to 8 million tons." SELF
CRITICISM
DOMESTIC BROADCAST—Total number of broadcasts in report-
ing period which meet criteria of category 23 above, and
thus have no target country.
FOREIGN BROADCAST—Total number of broadcasts in report-
ing period which do not meet criteria of category 23
above, and thus do refer to a target country/countries.
NORTH/SOUTH DISPUTES—Broadcast theme must refer to activi-
ties and actions that are pertinent to the North/South
disputes in Korea and Vietnam. Themes will be logged as
promotes two-nation concept or reunification of two
countries.
SUPPORT FOR OTHER WORLD COMMUNIST PARTIES—Broadcast must
make reference to the activities and actions of other
world Communist activities.
EXAMPLE ; "Officials of the Communist Party of the USA
received a tumultuous welcome today upon the
arrival at Jose Marti airport."
NOTE: THE COMPLETE CODING SHEET CAN BE SEEN IN APPENDIX B.
C. V70RLD EVENT INTERACTION SURVEY
1. How it Works !
"The world interaction survey is a program of research
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to develop the ability to describe, trace, compare, explain
and predict, under theoretical discipline, a particular
range of international behavior by means of indicator data."
^/Ref. 57 p. 3/ It provides for building indicators of be-
havioral regularities, trends, and changes in the direction
or pattern of activity in the complex flow of interaction.
The research is expected to contribute findings that shed
light on external performance traits and tendencies of
countries, and on the configurations of actions and re-
sponses in the political exchanges between countries.
The objective is to "gather reported acts committed
crossnationally by the upper level of officialdom of national
regimes in order to facilitate analyses of structures and
processes of action and response at the 'control level* of
international politics." ^Ref. 57 p. 1/
Event/interaction is a term that has been defined tech-
nically to specify the types of acts that occur at that
level. All kinds of problems, issues, contests, conflicts,
adjustments, and subjects rising in international political
relations are included as long as they relate to specific
and discrete acts that have been committed. Event/inter-
action is conceived overall to be a complex stream of




It is to be noted especially that domestic events, re-
ports of purposes and motivations of actors, ecological
factors, and various intra-system processes and effects
were excluded from the data collection. Also excluded
were editorial opinions, interpretative reports, specu-
lations on future international affairs, and generalized
reports on series of events. The reason for these exclu-
sions is to allow the acquisition of a relatively "pure"
body of information that pertains closely to what nations
do as they act and respond in international political
situations. A record of performance and of behavior in
the more exact sense is sought. /Ref. 57 p. 2/
In the current research project, all event/interactions
involving Cuba and some other actor/country were coded.
The source of the data was all the weekly issues of the
journal, Latin America , from April 1970 through September
1974. There was a total of 338 interactions involving Cuba
recorded during this time frame of which 293 could be con-
sidered favorable and 45 were coded as adverse.
The originator or initiator of an act is designated by
code number according to "nation" or "actor". Thus the U.S
has the identifying number 002. The Soviet Union is 365;
Cuba is 040, etc. These number codes apply, of course, to
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nations in both the originator and recipient categories.
Thus, 040 " acts to " 002 means the Cuba " acts to " the U.S.
The heart of the WEIS classification system is in the
designations of different types of "acting to." The classi-
fication scheme identifies 63 types of acts and, thus, pro-
vides 63 different coding possibilities, only one of which
would be appropriate to substitute for "acts to" in the ex-
ample given above. The case might have been 040 protests
to the U.S.
Since 63 different categories cannot be kept in mind by
anyone who is converting the action words to their numerical
equivalents, an ordering of the 63 codes in groups was de-
signed to assist in the memory. /Ref. 57 p. 9-10/
1. Twenty-two cue-words organize the 63 types. These
cue-words are not to be taken to be exact common-
language meanings. They are technical mnemonic
devices only. They are listed below.
2. A rough ordering of the 22 cue-words is provided
so that the first ten have to do with more peace-
ful, benign, cooperative, non-aggressive types of
events while the second group consists of more
belligerent, aggressive, conflict-related events.
No theoretical significance underlies this arrange-
ment and no scaling techniques are involved.
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The ordering is a convenience to assist coders in
remembering the system. The 22 reminders or cue-













Under each heading (i.e., yield) are additional cue-words
which refer directly to the 63 category system. The three
digit number equivalents are given here. For example YIELD
contains
:
Oil Surrender; yield to order; submit to arrest
012 Yield position; retreat; evacuate
013 Admit wrongdoing; retract statement
The entire list of 63 categories, organized as indicated
above, giving the word and number equivalents is listed in
Appendix A.
D. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE GRAPHIC PORTRAYAL
The following illustration provides graphic representa-
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V. CATEGORICAL SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS
A. INTRODUCTION
The results of the research will be presented in the
following manner. This chapter will concentrate on the
numerical findings (both attitudinal and behavioral) from
a categorical perspective. In other words, how do the
major categories fluctuate over the research period? The
chapter to follow (Chapter VI Analysis of Findings) will
blend together and consider all categories and their inter-
relationships on a period-by-period basis. Viewed from a
simplified perspective, this chapter will disclose the
factual numerical results while the following chapter will
provide the macro-analysis, significance, and meaning of
those results.
As previously indicated, a total of 108 days of Latin
America FBIS publications were drawn as a sample. This
sample encompassed 542 broadcast pages, and included there-
in were 963 separate broadcasts. Of this number 585 were
designated as foreign broadcasts, that is, with a country
other than Cuba as the "target country", while 378 were
considered as domestic broadcasts and pertained only to
internal matters within Cuba.
WEIS data comprised a total of 338 separate interactions
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involving Cuba and at least one other country. Of this
number 292 were evaluated as favorable to the target country
while 46 were considered as unfavorable interactions.
The research period, consisting of eighteen total quar-
ters or 54 months, was equally subdivided into 9 separate
periods of two quarters each. They are designated as follows,
and will be referred to as such throughout the remainder of
this research.
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
March 70 October 70 April 71 October 71 April 72
thru thru thru thru thru
September 70 March 71 September 71 March 72 September 72
Period 6 Period 7 Period 8 Period 9
October 72 April 73 October 73 April 74
thru thru thru thru
March 73 September 73 March 74 September 74
B. CONTENT ANALYSIS
1. General
Figure 1 shows a sample matrix used to code the
broadcasts. One of these was completed for each of the
nine reporting periods and the results of this coding are
listed in Appendix B.
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Figure 2 reflects a tally of each country and organ-
izational category by Area of Interest Evaluation, (favor-
able, unfavorable, neutral) . Any significance to be attached
to the Functional Target Areas of Interest, (political, scien-
tific-cultural-economic, and military) will be addressed in
the following chapter, Analysis of Findings.
Graphic representation will reflect the following
five categories and/or combination of categories which were
of primary interest in the research. They are the USSR,
USSR plus allies, U.S., U.S. plus allies, and Latin America.
Each country category of the coding sheet will now
be briefly, but individually, addressed.
2. USSR
Figure 3 graphically presents Cuba's attitudinal
disposition toward the USSR, using the Content Analysis
technique. There were a total of 80 themes, 41 of which
were favorable and 31 were neutral. There were no unfavor-
able themes relating to the USSR. While the graph is self-
explanatory it is interesting to note the similarities
between Periods 1-2, 5-6, 8-9. In each of these we can see
an increase in neutral themes as the favorable themes sharply
decrease. The opposite of this is true in Period 2-3 where we
have a decrease in neutral themes as the favorable themes
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either follow the favorable theme line or remain constant
between periods. The significance of this phenomena will be
explored in the next chapter.
3. USSR Plus Allies
Figure 4 portrays Cuba's attitudes towards the USSR
plus allies. In addition to the previously given USSR theme
breakdown, the Allies constituted an additional 152 themes
110 of which were favorable and 42 were neutral. Between
Periods 2-3 favorable themes were increasing while neutrals
were decreasing, while the opposite situation exists between
Periods 4-5, and 8-9 In all other periods, the trend dir-
ection was the same for both themes.
4. U.S .
Figure 5 shows the breakdown of the 246 themes which
represent Cuba's attitudinal view toward the U.S. Forty-
seven of these were neutral while 199 were unfavorable.
No favorable themes were recorded for the U.S. The only
trend direction deviations occur in Periods 1-2, and 3-4,
where neutral themes were increasing as unfavorable themes
were decreasing. In all other periods, the trend direction
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5. U.S. Plus Allies
Figure 6 shows the breakdown for how Cuba views the
U.S. Plus Allies. In addition to the previously noted U.S.
themes, 41 additional ones were recorded for the allies, 15
of which were neutral, 23 were unfavorable and 3 were favor-
able. The only trend direction deviations not previously
mentioned occurred in Period 3-4, where unfavorable themes
increase as neutral themes increase. Generally speaking,
favorable themes only occurred when unfavorable themes had
reached a low point and neutral themes had reached a high
point for the indicated reference period.
6. PRC
Fourteen themes were recorded which reflected Cuba's
view of the Peoples Republic of China. Seven of them were
favorable and seven were neutral. With the exception of
one neutral theme in Period 9, all previous themes were
recorded before Period 6.
7. Non-Aligned Asian/Pacific
There were no themes recorded in this category.
8. Non-Aligned Africa
There were a total of 26 themes which represented
Cuba's attitude toward this category. Fourteen were favor-





























Thirteen themes were recorded which reflected Cuba's
view toward this category. Eight of them were favorable and
5 were neutral. The majority of the neutral themes appeared
in Period 9.
10. Mid-East
There was only one theme relating to Cuba's attitudes
towards the non-aligned Middle-East countries. It was favor-
able and was recorded in Period 8.
11. Latin America
Figure 7 shows the theme breakdown for Cuba's atti-
tudinal view of the Latin American countries. A total of
121 themes were recorded, 55 of which were favorable, 35
unfavorable and 31 neutral. Several obvious trends stand
out when viewing this graph. There has been a general
downward trend in unfavorable themes throughout the period,
and a general upward trend in favorable and neutral themes
throughout the period. With the exception of Periods 5-6,
6-7, and 7-8, the unfavorable trend direction always follows
the favorable trend, and the neutral trend direction is
always opposite that of the favorable trend direction. Also,
the neutral trend direction is opposite to the unfavorable




























iA total of 23 themes were recorded to reflect Cuba's
views toward France, Canada and Japan. Eight of them were




The sixty-six themes recorded in this category
represented Cuba's view toward the countries of Communist
Asia. Sixty were favorable and 6 were neutral. The peak
of the favorable themes was reached in Period 5/ with a
general downward slope since that time.
14. OAS Organization
Twenty-three themes were recorded in this category
to reflect Cuba's toward this organization. Seventeen were
unfavorable and 6 were neutral. The peak of the unfavorable
themes was reached in Period 3.
15. U.N. Organization
The fourteen themes recorded in this category show
how Cuba viewed this organization. Nine of them were
neutral and 5 were favorable. No favorable themes were
recorded until Period 6.
16. Special Categories--Foreign/Pomestic Broadcasts
Of the 963 broadcasts, 585 were designated as for-
eign and placed in the categories indicated above, while
378 were concerned exclusively with internal domestic
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matters relating to political, military, education and
religious interests. A graph of the number of Foreign/
Domestic broadcasts can be seen in Figure 8.
The number of Foreign broadcasts reached a low in
Period 2 which would not be equaled until Period 8. Be-
tween that time, there was a rise in Periods 2-3, 3-4, and
5-6, and a decline in Periods 4-5, 6-7 and 7-8. The sharp
rise in Period 8-9 was evidently attributable to the after-
math of the Chilean coup.
The Domestic broadcasts followed an opposite trend
to Foreign in Periods 1-2 and 2-3. In Period 4 both of
them hit an all-time high which would not again be exceeded
during the course of the research, with Domestic broadcasts
exceeding that of Foreign. Subsequently, Domestic broad-
cast fell off rapidly through Period 7 at which time it
reached its all-time low. Thereafter, it began to rise
again and continued to do so through the end of the research
period.
With respect to Domestic broadcast alone, (Figure 9)
the number of favorable broadcast duplicated the Foreign
broadcast trend through Period 5, thereafter duplicating
the Domestic broadcast trend. With the exception of the
high peak in Period 4, the number and trend of the neutral
broadcast duplicated that of the domestic broadcast
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throughout the research period. Self-critical broadcasts
followed a similar trend through the first five periods,
peaking in Periods 2 and 4, thereafter receding rapidly to
a low point for the duration of the research period, and
finally reaching zero in Period 9.
The exact period-by-period numbers can be seen along
with the other results of Special Categories in Appendix B.
However, further comment on these categories will be re-
served until Chapter VI, Analysis of Findings.
C. WORLD EVENT INTERACTION SURVEY (WEIS)
1 . General
The results of the WEIS data for all periods can be
seen in Figure 10. All interactions were either categorized
as favorable or unfavorable in accordance with the standard
WEIS category criteria. I.e., 01X thru 10X = favorable;
11X thru 22X = unfavorable. The only exception to this was
category 022-Comment on Situation-Pessimistic, which was
considered unfavorable for the purposes of this research.
Again, graphic representation will depict the five
categories and/or combination of categories which were of
primary interest in the research. They are the same as
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All country and organization categories which had
interactions with Cuba during the period of the research,
will now be briefly, but individually addressed. Here again,
ramifications, inferences and significance etc. of trends
will be deferred until the following chapter.
Before proceeding, it should again be noted that WEIS
data included only a total of 338 separate interactions in-
volving Cuba and at least one other country. Of this num-
ber, 292 were evaluated as favorable to the target country
while 46 were considered as unfavorable interactions. While
it would be desirable to have a larger number of inter-
actions to more accurately represent behavior, this current
research should be viewed as only the initial effort to
trace a country's behavior, with the emphasis on testing a
new methodology rather than meeting numerical criteria.
2. USSR
Favorable =35 Unfavorable = 1
A sharp downward trend in favorable interactions as
indicated in Figure 11 can be seen in Period 1-2, followed
by a leveling off from Periods 2-4. A peak is reached be-
tween Period 5-6, again falling off in Period 7 and rising
and falling in Period 7-8 and 8-9 respectively. There was
only one unfavorable interaction between Cuba and the USSR



















































3. USSR Plus Allies
Favorable = 44 Unfavorable = 1
This category is depicted in Figure 12. Generally,
a similar situation existed as mentioned in the previous
category, with the following exceptions. A short-lived peak
in favorable interactions occurred in Period 3; and no down-
ward trend occurred between Period 6 and 7.
4. U.S.
Favorable 31 Unfavorable = 18
Figure 13 shows that very few favorable interactions
occurred between Cuba and the U.S. up to Period 5. This was
followed by an upward slope in Period 5-6 and downward dur-
ing Period 6-7. From that time, a sharp upward trend in
favorable interactions existed between the two countries.
Low points of unfavorable interactions occurred in Periods
2 and 4. Kighpoints occurred in Period 1 and 3, with a
gentle upward slope beginning in Period 4 thru 6, leveling
off from 6 to 7, climbing from 7 to 8 and again leveling off
at a surprising all-time high.
5. U.S. Plus Allies
Favorable - 39 Unfavorable = 21
As depicted in Figure 14, we see a steady decline
in favorable interactions occurring in this category from
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exists between this category and the previous one (U.S.).
Also, the trend direction of the unfavorable interactions
duplicate that of the previous category, (U.S.) with only
minor deviation in intensity.
6. Non-Aligned Asia/Pacific
Favorable = 2 Unfavorable =
Only two interactions were recorded in this category,
Both were favorable and occurred in Period 3.
7. Non-Aligned Africa
Favorable = 5 Unfavorable =
Only five interactions were recorded in this cate-
gory. All were favorable and occurred in Period 9.
8. Non-Aligned European
Favorable = 6 Unfavorable = 1
All but one of the favorable interactions occurred
in the latter two periods, while the only unfavorable
interaction occurred in the third period.
9. Latin America
Favorable = 184 Unfavorable = 18
Figure 15 depicts this category. As indicated, the
largest volume of interactions did occur in this category.
Favorable interactions either increased or remained constant
up to Period 6, at which time a decline appeared thru Period
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unfavorable interactions were recorded in this category no
significant trends can be detected other than a notable in-
crease appearing between Period 8 and 9.
10. Outliers
Favorable - 7 Unfavorable = 3
Most favorable interactions occurred in the latter
periods while the 3 unfavorable interactions were generally
recorded in the earlier periods.
11. OAS Organization
Favorable = 4 Unfavorable = 2
As indicated, all favorable interactions occurred
within the last four periods of the research period.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS
This chapter contains a period-by-period analysis of
the ramifications, inferences, aid interrelationships of
the various periods and category findings which resulted
from Content Analysis and WEIS data.
A. PERIOD 1 (MAR. 1970-SEPT. 1970)
1. Foreign /Domestic Broadcasts
It was during this period that the sugar harvest
failure was actually becoming history. The number of
Domestic broadcasts were at a low which would not be seen
for the next two years, while the number of Foreign broad-
casts were nearly two times that of Domestic. As with
every other period studied in this research except Period
2, the current period contained a proportionately larger
number of favorable Domestic broadcasts compared to neutral
and self-critical ones. Again, the low number of neutral
and self-critical broadcasts would not be seen for another
two years. Looking ahead, if we unequivocally stated that
Cuba became more critical over its domestic performance in
the next two and one-half years, we would only be partially
correct since we shall see that after Period 2, the number
of favorable Domestic broadcasts also rose sharply.
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2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies
During this period, Cuba expressed a higher degree
of unfavorable attitudinal expressions toward the U.S./
its allies and the Latin American countries than any other
period under study. The adverse attitudes expressed by
Cuba were spread across the Functional Target Areas of
Interest spectrum with the number of political and militar-
ily related comments predominatihg over that of scientific-
cultural-economic (S-C-E) expressions.
Cuba's unfavorable behavioral response to the U.S.
was also at a high that would not be exceeded until Period
8. Regardless of this adverse behavioral disposition to-
wards the U.S. alone, both favorable and unfavorable be-
havioral interactions toward the U.S. and its allies were
comparatively high during the period.
3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies
A close attitudinal and behavioral situation exis-
ted between Cuba and the USSR and its allies which would
not be exceeded until Period 4 for attitudes, and Period
5 for behavior. Most of the favorable attitudinal support
was for the USSR and spread fairly evenly across the Func-
tional Target Area of Interest spectrum. The neutral
expressions were predominantly related to S-C-E interest
in the Bloc Supporters and Bloc Deviants. Compared to
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other periods, there was also a significant amount of neutral
interest expressed towards the Mid-East Sympathizer countries
during this period.
4. Latin America
As stated previously, attitudinal expressions were
high towards Latin America while favorable and unfavorable
behavioral responses were at an all-time low during the
period which would never be duplicated again during the
research span. Nearly all of the expressed attitudes were
of a political nature.
5. Outliers, Non-Aligned Africa and Communist Asia
Some favorable to neutral support, of an S-C-E
nature, was expressed towards the Outlier countries and
the countries which make up the Non-Aligned Africa category.
A relatively large number of favorable attitudinal
expressions were made toward the countries of Communist
Asia all across the Functional Target Area of Interest
spectrum; however, no behavioral response was recorded.
6. OAS and UN
Expressions toward the OAS were expectedly adverse
and of a political nature, while that towards the U.N.
was neutral.
7 • Special Categories
In reference to Special Categories, favorable
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responses were made concerning Cuba's dependence upon the
USSR and its role as an instrument of the USSR's policy.
A favorable expression was made toward Chile, in addition
to comments in support of promoting revolution in Latin
America. There were four broadcasts which expressed support
for other world Communist parties.
B. PERIOD 2 (OCT. 70-MAR. 71)
1. Foreign/Domestic Broadcasts
One obvious feature of this period was the sharp
downward trend in Foreign broadcasts as opposed to the in-
crease in the number of Domestic broadcasts. Most likely
this could have been attributable to the aftermath of the
"1970 Sugar Harvest Failure". This is further substantiated
by the sharp increase in the number of self-critical and
neutral broadcasts to a point beyond that of favorable
broadcast, a feat that would not be duplicated again during
the entire research period.
2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies
The forementioned situation was accompanied by the
following consistent attitudinal and behavioral changes:
a slight mellowing of attitudes and behavioral reactions
toward the U.S. and its allies, in that the unfavorable
phenomena showed a general decrease during this time frame;
and, accompanying this decrease was a slight upward shift
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in neutral attitudinal themes. Again, most of the adverse
expressions were politically related, followed by S-C-E
and military expressions which were much lower in number,
but somewhat equal to each other.
3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies
Relations between Cuba and the USSR appear to have
cooled during this time frame in that the previously favor-
able expressions have now been replaced with neutral ex-
pressions. While there was some neutral support for the
Bloc Supporters, most favorable expressions were directed
toward the Deviants, Sympathizers, and Supporters, respect-
ively.
4. PRC, Non-Aligned Africa, and the OAS
The first favorable political expression was dir-
ected toward the PRC during this period, while the countries
of Non-Aligned Africa and the OAS were targets of adverse
political expression.
5. Latin America
Concerning Latin America, there was a sharp drop in
both favorable and unfavorable expressions while neutral
interest increased. Behaviorally, the only change was a
slight increase in unfavorable reactions.
6. Outliers and Communist Asia
Attitudinal expressions toward Outliers were still
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neutral while favorable and unfavorable behavioral reactions
were both low.
Although favorable political expressions were still
being directed toward Communist Asia, no behavioral reac-
tions were recorded during this or any other time period
under investigation.
7 . Special Categories
Favorable Chilean broadcasts continued to emanate
from Cuba, as well as several broadcasts concerning World
Communist Party Support and one broadcast favoring Korean
unification.
C. PERIOD 3 (APR. 71-SEPT. 71)
1. Foreign/Domestic Broadcasts
During this period the number of Foreign broadcasts
again exceeded the declining Domestic broadcasts. In this
situation, which is opposite to that of Period 2, favorable
and neutral broadcasts were also down sharply.
2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies
There was a significant increase in unfavorable
attitudinal expressions and behavioral responses toward the
U.S. and its allies, which would not be witnessed again in
such magnitude, until much later in the research period.
Neutral expressions towards the U.S. showed a slight in-
crease while those relating to the U.S. plus allies
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decreased. The overwhelming number of expressions were
politically related, followed by S-C-E and military themes.
Consistent with this attitudinal phenomena, favorable be-
havioral responses toward the U.S. and its allies continued
to decrease or remain constant.
3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies
Contrasted to the unfavorable situation which ex-
isted between Cuba and the U.S., an opposite, or highly
favorable attitudinal situation began to unfold between
Cuba and the Soviet oriented countries. It appears that
the previous period of neutral relations had now transi-
tioned into a favorable phenomena since neutral expressions
fell sharply. The favorable expressions were evenly distri-
buted between the USSR and its allied country categories
and primarily S-C-E motivated, followed closely by political
themes. In spite of this favorable attitudianl environ-
ment, Cuba's behavior towards the USSR remained at its con-
stant low and there was only a slight increase in favorable
responses to the USSR plus allies.
4. PRC
Although favorable political and S-C-E inspired ex-
pressions towards the PRC reached their peak, behavioral
responses were not visible during this period or any other




Political and S-C-E related expressions towards
Non-Aligned Africa were also prominent during this period,
but again no behavioral responses were to be noted in this
category until much later in the research.
6. Non-Aligned Europe
Cuba's first expressions towards Non-Aligned
Europe were recorded during this period and both were
S-C-E related.
7. Latin America
The attitudinal situation between Cuba and Latin
America was a mixture between that towards the U.S. orien-
ted countries and the Soviet oriented countries, in that
unfavorable and favorable expressions rose while neutrals
declined. The same mixture is behaviorally true since
favorable reactions remained constant while unfavorable
responses rose slightly. The adverse attitudinal ex-
pressions primarily involved political and military themes,
much of which was directed towards Brazil.
8. Outliers, UN, and the OAS
Cuba's attitude toward the Outliers and the UN
remained neutral, while that towards the OAS became more




Strong politically favorable expressions towards
Communist Asia continued to emanate from Cuba.
10. Special Categories
Cuba became more neutral in its expressions of it-
self as an instrument of the USSR during the period.
Favorable Chile broadcasts became more prominent
and Cuba continued to overtly advocate revolution in Latin
America.
Support for Other World Communist Parties decreased
to one broadcast during the period.
D. PERIOD 4 (OCT. 71 -MAR. 72)
1
.
Foreign /Domes tic Broadcasts
For only the second time in the research period
the number of Domestic broadcasts exceeded that of Foreign
broadcasts, although both were at an all-time high. Con-
sistent with this was also a sharp upsurge in all cate-
gories of Domestic broadcasts.
2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allie s
Under these circumstances there was a general
leveling off of unfavorable attitudinal expressions and a
sharp decrease in unfavorable behavioral reactions towards
the U.S. and its allies. However, neutral expressions
towards the U.S. and its allies reached a peak that would
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not be exceeded until Period 9. Although adverse political
expressions were predominant, S-C-E and military related
themes were still well represented.
3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies
Keeping in mind that the unfavorable attitudinal
situation between Cuba and the U.S. was at near all-time
high, the favorable attitudinal situation between the USSR
and Cuba had reached an undisputed all-time high during
this period which would not be surpassed in the course of
the research. (Referring back to Figures 3 and 5, an
interesting relationship is now obvious. The graphs shows
that from this point on, the unfavorable attitudinal ex-
pressions toward the U.S. will parallel that of the favor-
able expressions toward the USSR. This trend similarity
will persist until Period 8, where an anomaly occurs)
Most of this favorable environment is S-C-E related and an
increasingly significant amount of it involves the Bloc
Supporters and Bloc Deviants. Despite this favorable
attitudinal change, a similar behavioral change toward
the USSR and its allies was surprisingly not evident, and
in fact, the situation actually worsened during the period.
4. PRC, Non-Aligned Africa/Europe,- UN, and the OAS
Attitudinal expressions toward the PRC became more
neutral and focused on political themes; and, expressions
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toward Africa and the U.N. also became more neutral. While
attitudes towards Europe continued in a favorable vein,
those towards the OAS still ranged from unfavorable to
neutral.
5. Latin America
Attitudinally, favorable expressions towards Latin
America were constant while unfavorable themes declined
and neutrals climbed. Behaviorally, favorable interactions
increased while unfavorable ones declined. Most attitudinal
expressions remained politically motivated.
6. Outliers and Communist Asia
Several S-C-E related expressions were directed
towards the Outliers, while increasingly significant polit-





Chilean broadcasts were now evenly distributed
between favorable and neutral, and broadcasted support
for Other World Communist Parties continued at a minimum.
E. PERIOD 5 (APR. 72-SEPT. 72)
1. Foreign/Domestic Broadcasts
During this period there was a sharp decrease in
Foreign and Domestic broadcasts and a similar downward
trend in all three categories of Domestic broadcasts.
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2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies
Unfavorable attitudinal comments toward the U.S.
and its allies plunged sharply downward as a result of a
significant decrease in adverse political and economic ex-
pressions. Neutral expressions showed only a minor down-
ward trend. Regardless of this improving situation, these
attitudes were not manifested in Cuba's behavior toward
the U.S. and its allies; in fact, unfavorable behavior
toward the U.S. and its allies actually increased from the
previous period.
3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies
A virtual opposite situation existed between Cuba
and the USSR and its allies concerning expressed attitudes
and manifested behavior. While favorable attitudes plunged
sharply downward, neutral expressions remained static in
the case of the USSR, and continued to increase in the case
of the USSR plus allies. Nearly all of the attitudes were
SrC-E related and evenly distributed between the USSR and
the Bloc Supporters. Expressions toward Bloc Deviants shifted
from favorable to neutral in comparison with the previous
period, but were still S-C-E related. Behaviorally, the
number of favorable interactions showed a very sharp in-
crease and appeared to be lagging the favorable attitudinal




During this period the last favorable attitudinal
comment was expressed toward the PRC.
5. Non-Aligned Africa
A significant increase in favorable political
attitudes towards Non-Aligned Africa was also witnessed
during this period.
6. Latin America
Relative to Latin America, there was an increase
in both favorable and unfavorable attitudes while neutral
expression held constant. Again, most of the expressions
were politically related and all of the favorable ex-
pressions were directed towards Peru. With the exception of
favorable interactions being constant the behavioral situ-
ation between Cuba and Latin America was consistent with
that of the attitudinal expressions.
7. Outliers and the OAS
Expressions toward the Outliers and. the OAS sub-
sided somewhat and appeared to shift to a more neutral
position.
8. Communist Asia
Cuban attitudes towards Communist Asia peaked




9 . Special Categories
Chilean broadcasts again shifted to a more favorable
tone, and Support for World Communist Parties achieved a
peak during this period; a broadcast relating to the reuni-
fication of North/South Vietnam was also made.
F. PERIOD 6 (OCT. 72-MAR. 73)
1. Foreign/Domestic Broadcasts
During this period Foreign broadcasts reached a
near all-time high for the research span, while the number
of Domestic broadcasts continued to fall at a slower rate
than the previous period. Favorable and neutral Domestic
broadcasts also fell at a decreased rate, while the number
of self-critical broadcasts increased slightly.
2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies
Unfavorable attitudinal expressions toward the U.S.
and its allies continued to decrease, while the number of
neutral expressions either decreased or remained static.
This phenomena was a result of the continuing decrease in
adverse political and military themes; however, adverse
S-C-E related themes showed a slight increase during the
period. Here again, a behavioral lag was apparent since
favorable manifestations of the previous "mellowing" atti-
tudinal disposition were now obvious. A probable altern-
ative to this "lag" theory was the "detente-like" atmosphere
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which existed between Cuba and the U.S. in the midst of the
Anti-Hijacking Treaty, which reached fruition during that
time frame. In spite of this promising situation, there
still was an increase in the number of unfavorable inter-
actions with the U.S.; and, the same situation was apparent
with respect to the U.S. plus allies, but at a higher rate
of increase.
3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies
Another significant, transition period appeared to
occur with respect to Cuba's attitude and behavior toward
the USSR and its allies. With respect to the USSR alone,
the rate of decrease in favorable expressions began to
level off, while the number of neutral expressions rose
sharply. S-C-E related themes were still predominant,
followed closely by political expressions. A sharp rise
in both favorable and neutral expressions was recorded
for Cuba's attitude toward the USSR and its allies. Again
most of this increase was attributable to a rise in S-C-E
related themes, although a significant number of favorable
political themes relating to the Bloc Deviant countries
was recorded. Also in this period, increasing favorable
and neutral interest was expressed toward the Mid-East
Soviet Sympathizer countries. In spite of this significant
change in attitude, Cuba's behavioral disposition toward
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the USSR and its allies remained absolutely static from the
previous period.
4. Non-Aligned Africa/Europe
While favorable political support for the Non-
Aligned African countries waned, similar support for the
Non-Aligned European countries increased slightly.
5. Latin America
Favorable attitudes towards Latin America continued
to increase, while unfavorable and neutral expressions de-
clined slightly. The favorable behavioral manifestations
toward Latin America showed a sharp rate of increase during
the period, while unfavorable behavioral responses decreased
slightly. Attitudinally, the expressions were distributed
all across the Functional Areas of Target Interest spectrum,
although political and S-C-E related themes remained pre-
dominant. Most of the favorable attitudinal expressions
and behavioral responses were directed ' towards Peru,
Nicaragua, Panama, Mexico, and the pro-Cuban Carribbean
countries
.
6. Outliers and the UN
The Outlier countries and the UN received favorable
S-C-E related support and favorable behavioral support in




OAS and Communist Asia
Adverse political themes toward the OAS showed an
increase, and favorable political and S-C-E related themes
directed toward the countries of Communist Asia exhibited
a significant downward trend.
8. Special Categories
Although Cuba expressed favorable sentiments to-
wards dependence on the USSR, its view towards being an
instrument of the USSR were neutral.
Favorable Chilean broadcasts were at a near all-
time high, and promotion of revolution in Latin America
was still being overtly advocated.
G. PERIOD 7 (APR. 73-OCT. 73)
1 Foreign/Pomestic Broadcasts
The number of Foreign and Pomestic broadcasts fell
sharply during this period and all categories of Domestic
broadcasts showed a similar trend.
2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies
Unfavorable attitudinal expressions toward the U.S
and its allies continued to decrease at the same rate,
while neutral expressions remained the same as the previous
period. The continuing decrease in adverse political com-
ments was responsible for this phenomena. However, as a
probable aftermath of the Anti-Hi jacking Pact euphoria, an
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extremely sharp decrease in favorable behavioral manifes-
tation toward the U.S. and its allies was recorded.
3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies
Concerning relations between Cuba and the USSR, it
appears that the transition phase mentioned in the previous
period's description had continued to lag into this period.
In short, all favorable and neutral attitudinal expressions
decreased sharply, and behavioral responses plunged to a
near all-time low. It was also during this period that the
only unfavorable behavioral interaction occurred between
these two countries.
A near similar situation existed between Cuba and
the USSR plus allies, with the exception that favorable
attitudes and behavior remained constant from the previous
period. Most of the favorable expressions were a result
of political and S-C-E related responses towards Bloc
Deviant countries and the majority of the neutral ex-
pressions concerned political responses toward Bloc
Supporters and a few towards Bloc Deviants. The last ex-
pression of political support for the Mid-East Soviet
Sympathizers was also expressed during this period.
4. Non-Aligned Africa and the OAS
There was a significant increase in neutral polit-
ical attitudes toward the Non-Aligned African countries,
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while adverse political comments toward the OAS increased
only slightly during the period.
5. Non-Aligned Europe, Outliers, and Communist Asia
Favorable political support for the countries of
Non-Aligned Europe decreased slightly, while favorable
political and S-C-E related support for the Outlier and
Communist Asian countries remained virtually the same as
the previous period.
6. Latin America
It was during this period that a significant tran-
sition occurred in Cuba's attitudes and behavior toward
the Latin American countries. Favorable attitudes showed
a significant decrease, while neutral expression went up
sharply, and unfavorable expressions increased slightly.
In line with this attitudinal change, a behavioral reaction
was reflected by a slight decrease in favorable and a
slight increase in unfavorable interactions.
7. Special Categories
Attitudinal support for Chile was still predom-
inantly favorable during the period; this period also re-




H. PERIOD 8 (OCT. 73-MAR. 73)
1. Foreign/Domestic Broadcasts
During this period, Foreign broadcasts fell to an
all-time low which was equal to that of Period 2, while the
number of Domestic broadcasts began to exhibit an upward
trend.
2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies
Unfavorable attitudinal expressions toward the
U.S. and its allies reached an all-time low at this time,
while neutral expressions reached lows which were rarely
exceeded previously. Along with this auspicious attitudinal
situation, the number of favorable behavioral interactions
reached a high which was only exceeded once previously, in
Period 6.
3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies
Another transition appeared evident with respect
to Cuban-Soviet relations in that there was a sharp decrease
in favorable attitudinal expressions toward the USSR and its
allies. All expressions were related to S-C-E interests in
these countries. Neutral expressions remained constant in
the case of the USSR and reached an all-time low in the case
of the USSR plus allies. This highly unfavorable attitudinal
situation was accompanied by a sharp increase in favorable




Attitudinal expressions toward Non-Aligned Africa
became more politically favorable, while those towards the
Non-Aligned European countries remained the same.
5. Outliers, UN, Communist Asia, and the OAS
Favorable attitudes toward the Outliers and the
U.N. organization increased, while those towards Communist
Asia continued to decrease. Political expressions toward
the OAS assumed a neutral tone during this period.
6. Latin America
An attitudinal transition appeared to have occurred
with respect to Cuban-Latin American relations during this
period. Favorable attitudes were again on the increase, while
neutral and unfavorable expressions continued to decrease
sharply. All expressions were of a political and S-C-E
nature. Again, this favorable attitudinal situation was not
evident in Cuba's behavior towards Latin America in that




In spite of the encouraging situation which had
developed between Cuba and the USSR during the period, Cuba
nevertheless expressed an adverse desire towards being an
instrument of the USSR.
As an obvious result of Chile's Allende overthrow
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in September, Cuba also expectedly shifted to expressions of
vehement opposition to the new regime.
During this time frame, Cuba made one overt broad-
cast which still advocated Revolution in Latin America; and,
support for Other World Communist Parties decreased slightly
during the period.





The number of Foreign broadcasts reversed itself
and began to climb upward during this period, while the num-
ber of Domestic broadcasts continued their upward slope at
about the same rate as the previous period. Also, follow-
ing the lead of the previous period, the favorable and
neutral broadcasts continued upward while the self-critical
broadcasts became non-existent.
2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies
An apparent anomaly occurred in the attitudinal
situation between Cuba and the U.S. and its allies. For the
first time since Period 3 and 4, the number of favorable and
neutral attitudinal expressions reversed their downward trend
and began a sharp upward slope. Since all of these adverse
political and S-C-E related expressions were directed towards
the U.S., this change could probably be interpreted as a
delayed reaction to the alleged U.S. inspired Chilean coup,
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which occurred in September 1973. In spite of this inaus-
picious attitudinal situation, Cuba's manifested behavior
toward the U.S. and its allies did not follow suit. As a
matter of fact, favorable interactions between these actors
reached an unprecedented high during the period, while un-
favorable interactions remained static from the previous
period.
3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies
With the exception of a rise in neutral attitudinal
expressions, the exact opposite of the U.S. situation occurred
between Cuba and the USSR and its allies, with respect to the
other attitudes and resulting behavior. In all cases, atti-
tudinal expressions and behavioral responses reached an un-
precedented low for the research period.
4. Non-Aligned Europe
Although political and S-C-E related support for
the Non-Aligned European countries became more neutral, favor-
able behavioral responses reached a high for the research
period.
5. Outliers and Communist Asia
Expressions towards Outliers became more neutral;
and, support for Communist Asia became significantly more





OAS and the UN
Although adverse OAS expressions increased signi-
ficantly, the highest number of favorable interactions be-
tween these actors occurred during this period.
U.N. related expressions showed only a slightly




A similar situation to that of the Cuban-U.S.
relationship occurred between Cuba and Latin America. Again,
unfavorable attitudinal expressions and behavioral responses
began an upward trend, while neutral expressions remained
constant. Although favorable attitudinal expressions con-
tinued upward, favorable behavioral interactions reversed
the previous downward trend and climbed to a heretofore un-
surpassed high for the research period.
8. Special Categories
Adverse Chilean broadcasts continued at the same
pace as the previous period and support for Other World
Communist parties increased slightly.
In conclusion, it is also significant to note that
the only favorable statements made by Cuba relating to re-
newed relations with the U.S. occurred during this period.
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VII. PROBLEM AREAS AND LIMITATIONS
Having completed a comprehensive analysis of Cuba's
world view over the past four and one-half years, it can be
stated conclusively and unequivocally that Cuba's attitudes
are not consistently indicative of current or future behavior,
and Cuba's behavior does not accurately reflect its attitudes
of the world. Thus, if we were forced to attach a statistical
measure of correlation between Cuba's attitudes and resulting
behavior, it would be low.
Remembering that the intent of this research was to
focus on and determine the "how" of attitude and behavioral
changes rather than the "why", it is appropriate to consider
some of the intervening variables, problems, and biases that
could have influenced our findings, analysis, conclusions
and future projections, which follow.
While it seems unlikely that a more reliable and com-
prehensive source, than a report of a country's domestic and
foreign broadcasts, could be used to measure its attitudes
of the world, in any country and especially a communist
country, propaganda has great value and impact. Often a
country is obligated to take a predetermined stand on a
particular issue or international situation, regardless of
whether its people and government may disagree with it at
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the time. This is particularly appropriate in the case of
Cuba's "expected" anti-U.S. role and pro-Soviet position.
In the case of the current research, although it certainly
cannot be disputed that Cuba engages in extensive propagan-
dizing, it appeared to have little, if any, effect on their
expressed attitudes. This is evidenced merely by looking at
the consistently downward trend in unfavorable comments to-
ward the U.S. and the "see-saw" trend in favorable attitudes
toward the USSR. Therefore, we could say, in the short run
propagandizing by a country could influence its expressed
attitudes, but in the long run the effect is negligible.
Therefore, analyzing FBIS is a reasonable operationalization
of Cuban attitudes, vice propaganda.
While the WEIS has great merit in arriving at a
country's real-world behavioral patterns, the source used
for WEIS coding is of utmost importance. In the current
research, it was thought that in several categories an in-
sufficient number of interactions were available to draw
realistic and hopefully reliable conclusions. By using
the Journal Latin America , there was what appeared to be,
a built-in bias to report a larger number of events,
occurrences, and interactions involving other Latin
American countries. This is not meant as derogatory and
should naturally be expected when utilizing any publication
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which focuses on a particular sphere or area. This short-
coming can be easily remedied by the addition of other
representative and diversified sources, preferrably that of
newspaper clipping services and intelligence reports, which
generally include impartial reports of worldwide events.
While it was attempted to make reference to obvious
lags in behavior or leads in attitude, the entire phenomena
of possible leads and lags, in the results of this research
alone, could occupy substantial time, space and effort be-
yond the scope and capability of this project. Nevertheless,
it is an area of concern and interest which should be address-
ed in any follow-on projects as a next logical step in this
type of research. For instance, are there any consistent
patterns of lead and lag over the various time periods?
Does favorable behavior towards the USSR exhibit a con-
sistent periodic lag behind attitudes, or vice-versa? Does
a periodic unfavorable attitudinal trend toward the USSR
lead a favorable (less unfavorable) attitudinal trend to-
ward the U.S., or vice versa? Apply the same type of reason-
ing to all categories, and it becomes increasingly apparent
that a whole new complex area of investigation has come
into play.
While only a few of the pitfalls and possible errors
of this research have been identified, they did constitute
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those problems with the greatest significance and impact on
the results. Overall, it appears that any such unfavorable
phenomena has been kept to an absolute minimum. The point
remains, although this methodology and resulting conclusions
may possess some shortcomings, it nevertheless did accomplish
what it intended to do and appears to be the best tool for
accomplishing this difficult task at present.
A. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE LIMITATIONS OF PREDICTION
The following chapter configures the results of this
study into a format that could be useful to the policymaker
and intelligence officer. However, before looking at this
it seems appropriate to first enlighten the reader on some
of the difficulties that can occur if the art of prediction
is not viewed in the proper perspective.
The wizardry of contemporary technology notwithstand-
ing, the essential and lasting methodology of future-pre-
dicting was set forth in the early 18th century by the great
Leibniz. One sentence, taken from his "Principles of Nature
and of Grace, " will suffice to express the crucial elements
of Leibniz's law of continuity: The present is big with
the future, the future might be read in the past, the dis-
tant is expressed in the near .
The premises and assumptions of Leibniz's law are
vital to our belief that predicting and forecasting are
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possible. For the moment, however, it should be stressed that
not all the marvels of computer technology and related devises
have in any way supplanted our reliance upon this profound,
if questionable, Leibnizian view of the relation among past,
present, and future. Either the future does lie in the pres-
ent, and hence is subject to observation through dissection,
or it does not. And if it does not, all the computers and
systems analysis and linear programming in the world will not
help us. For it is sheer delusion to suppose that anything
short of H.G. Well's Time Machine can in fact get us into
the future, as technology gets us across space to the moon.
Albert Somit seems to subcribe to the latter thesis
by stating the following points: (1) contemporary forays
into the future are no better, and generally worse, ceteris
paribus , than the forays into the future that our grand-
fathers~-Tocqueville, Comte, Marx, et al—made; (2) the
only real utility of these fast accumulating reports and
books on the future is the often enlightening, generally
informative, sometimes brilliant perceptions they contain
the present. /Ref. 44, p. 261-262/
Referring to the work that demographers and other
statistical analysts do by way of explicating the world we
live in, Somit says, "it is indeed important to know how
big 'big' is, how fast 'fast' is, etc. These activities
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are valuable, as are the technological devices that today
accompany and reinforce them. They will not, however,
supplant speculation, raw speculation, when it comes to
predictions that go more than a very short time from the
immediate present. /Ret. 44, p. 263/
By this time it should be obvious that Somit believes
that the present is not big with the future. Nor, let it
be well understood, was the past ever big with what is now
the present. He says we are confusing continuity of chron-
ology with continuity of circumstance and event. /Ref. 44,
p. 263_7
Nothing could seem more certain to the individual for
whom reality consists of the hard data of atoms, molecules,
reflexes, social-security numbers, and the like than that
absolute knowledge of the hard data of the present should
yield
—
properly processed in the machines—knowledge of
the future. But Somit says, it won't and never will ....
and the reason is ... . that the present does not contain
the future, the far is not to be found in the near, nor was
our present ever contained in the past, not if what we are
concerned with is change . _/Ref. 44, p. 264/ .... "trends"
are particularly suspect. A trend, the dictionary tells us,
is the general direction taken by a stream, a shoreline,
etc.; it is an underlying or prevailing tendency or
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inclination. These are all tempting words for the historian
or predicter of societal development. How easy it is, as
we look back over the past— that is, of course, the "past"
that has been selected for us by historians and social
scientists— to see in it trends and tendencies that appear
to possess the iron necessity and clear directionality of
growth in a plant or organism. We think of these "trends"
as cumulative movements, as genetic sequences, as actually
causal . But, the relation among past, present, and future
is chronological, not causal.
What Emile Durkheim wrote on all this is profound and,
obviously, still relevant: It said, writes Durkheim, "that
history has for its object precisely the linking of events
in their order of succession. But it is impossible to con-
ceive how the stage which a civilization has reached at a
given moment could be the determining cause of a subsequent
state. The stages of that humanity successively traverses
do not engender one another
. /Ref. 44, p. 265/
"All that one can observe experimentally is a
series of changes among which a causal bond does not exist.
The antecedent stage does not produce the subsequent one ,
but the relation between them is exclusively chronological .
Under these circumstances all scientific prevision is im-
possible." /Ref. 44, p. 26_5/
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That one can, through religious or philosophical
metaphor, summarize, encapsulate, on the basis of skillful
selection of a few events and changes from the past, is not
to be doubted; that one can form in his mind, through this
type of selection and through one or another metaphor,
"trends" that have vivid meaning to his mind is not to be
doubted either. However, to confuse "trends" with processes
that have in fact genetic continuity and causal connection
in time is to take the metaphor of growth much too seriously
in its application to human behavior in time.
The hypothesis of growth is useful only in the under-
standing of entities that do actually grow and develop
—
such as plants and organisms—and for all else it is either
naive or dangerous. ^-e f« 44, p. 265/
Somit goes on to use a model of change in time that
seems to be much better than models drawn from organic
growth. It is based on what happens with the throw of the
dice. Hypnotized by either the surpassing good luck or bad
luck, one may imagine the existence of continuities too
extraordinary to be explained by chance. Nevertheless,
such continuities are random and chronological, not causal.
Even if twenty naturals were thrown in succession, no
genetic trend would exist; only the laws of probability would
have been stretched. Even twenty or a hundred naturals would
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not have in their unbroken succession, the slightest influ-
ence upon what the next throw would yield. To predict any-
thing on the basis of five, twenty, or a hundred naturals
in succession would be, plainly, impossible.
Could we therefore predict nothing? Not at all. We
could confidently predict that the dice game would go on,
that gambling would go on,
that Las Vegas would continue to sprawl even farther out
into the desert and that the number of
Americans visiting Las Vegas, at the present rates of in-
crease, would by A.D. 2100 reach the point where there
would be twenty-eight little old ladies in front of each
slot machine in contrast to the two invariably there now.
Somehow this kind of predicting isn't very exciting
once your hopes have been raised by apparent continuities
of the dice, but it is still prediction, isn't it?, and it
is the kind of prediction, like it or not, that you will
get in books on the year 2000.
The crucial point, though, is this: what is signifi-
cantly different and novel about American society in 1968
did not "grow out of" American society of 1868, fond though
we may be of the lovely, thought-narcotizing metaphor of
growth with all its comfortable words regarding genetic
continuity, trends, causality, and the like. What is new
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and vital in science today— that is what has changed in
time—could not possibly have been predicted a generation
ago. Of course not. What is manifest today was not then
latent, was not "in" the science of that time. /Ref. 44,
p. 266/
In summary, two points should be clear: (1) events
do not marry and have little events that grow into big
events which in turn marry and have little events, etc.
;
(2) small social changes do not accumulate directionally
and continuously to become big changes. We pretend in our
histories and sociologies that such is the case, but it is
all a posteriori , suffers badly from an affliction known
as the pathetic fallacy, and does more to assuage the pain
of intellectual disorder than it does to throw light on the
actual process of social change.
At this point the reader may be justified in asking
himself what purpose there is in prediction what value
can be derived from it in light of the foregoing? The
answer to this lies in the following the often en-
lightening, generally informative, sometimes brilliant per-
ceptions that are revealed about the present . No doubt this
point alone makes "future-predicting" worthwhile, for there
is nothing like an assignment to gaze into the future for
sharpening one's awareness of what lies around him in the
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present. Furthermore, significant credibility can be assumed
to accompany predictions when utilized for short-term rather
than a long-range purpose.
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VI I I . PREDICTIVE CAPABI LITY AND APPLICABILITY
FOR POLICY-MAKING COMMUNITY
A. INTRODUCTION
It is important for the policymaker to be able to
forecast the future actions and reactions of a specific
country, to a certain degree, before implementing any
policy concerning that country. However, before attempt-
ing such a forecast, it is imperative that he has a fairly
reliable and thorough analysis of past and current attitud-
inal and behavioral relationships of that country with other
countries and especially with his own.
For the intelligence officer, the relationship be-
tween Third World countries and the superpowers is absolutely
necessary for assessing potential/future allies, sympa-
thizers, and supporters, whether it be in time of peace,
cold war, or hot war, either current or
•
projected.
Both of these situations demand a reliable and con-
sistent methodology for the gathering and analysis of data
necessary for each of these individuals to arrive at a
decision or make an assessment, whether it be for political,
economic, socio-cultural, or intelligence purposes.
An objective of this project was to create and experi-
ment with a new research tool for arriving at Cuba's views
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toward the other major actors of the world. In so doing,
it was found necessary to account not only for attitudinal
expressions, but behavioral patterns as well. Having done
this, it was further intended that such an analysis of past
actions would not only be useful in assessing the current
outlook of a specific country, but also aid in a projection
of the future attitudes and behavior that could reasonably
be expected from that country.
Theoretically, the decisionmakers can apply this
methodology towards the resource publications of his choice
over any two periods in time, using as many or as few cate-
gories as he desires. By determining a trend (increase,
decrease or constant) between those two periods he can then
compare it with the following analysis of the consistent
trends and relationships between categories which were in
evidence during each period of the research. (A complete
comparison of each periodic trend for each major category
can be seen in Figure 16)
.
It is perhaps important to understand how this
analysis was accomplished before proceeding. With that
purpose in mind, look at the following excerpt from Figure 16
CATEGORY /PERIOD 7
WJ®\DOMESTIC BROADCASTS m _. ± H
DOMESTIC NEUTRAL I ",'' T' I _E
_____
_
U.S. PLUS ALLIES FAVOR.!_I _ { i«y 7T
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In the above situation, the analysis would be as
follows
:
(A) As the number of Domestic broadcasts increased, the
number of:
1. Neutral Domestic broadcasts increased, and
2. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
remained constant.
(See (a) to follow)
The following example will illustrate a different
situation.
CATEGORY/PERIOD
7TV IE m m iU.S. ATTITUDES UNFAVORABLE 1
L.A. BEHAVIORAL UNFAVORABLE /.* ± ±f~
(LL) As unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. decreased:
1. No consistencies or relationships were found to
exist with further categories.
(See(LLj to follow)
It is important to remember that all category relation-
ships are interrelated. For instance if the following (FF)
occurs, (favorable attitudes toward the USSR decreased) not
only are all the consistent relationship listed under it
applicable but also(CC) since it is related to (CC)i 1 . which is
the same as (FF;.
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An analysis of Figure 16 now follows.
B. PREDICTIVE CAPABILITY
(A) As the number of Domestic broadcasts increased, the
number of:
1. neutral Domestic broadcasts increased, and
2. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
remained constant.
.(AA) As the number of Domestic broadcasts decreased, the
number of:
1. neutral Domestic broadcasts decreased.
(B) As Foreign broadcasts increased, the number of:
1. favorable behavioral interactions toward the
USSR decreased or remained constant,
2. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. increased or
remained constant,
3. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased or remained constant, and
4. favorable attitudes and behavior toward Latin
America increased or remained constant.
(BB) As Foreign broadcasts decreased:
1. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies in-
creased or remained constant,




3. unfavorable behavioral interactions increased or
remained constant.
(C) As favorable Domestic broadcasts increased:
1. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased or remained constant, and
2. favorable attitudes toward Latin America in-
creased or remained constant.
(CC) As favorable Domestic broadcasts decreased:
1. favorable attitudes toward the USSR, decreased,
2. unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. decreased,
and
3. unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased.
(D) As neutral Domestic broadcasts increased:
1. neutral attitudes toward the USSR increased or
remained constant, and
2. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
remained constant.
(DD) As neutral Domestic broadcasts decreased:
1. favorable interactions toward the USSR increased
or remained constant,




3. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased/ and
4. unfavorable interactions toward the U.S. plus
allies increased or remained constant.
(E) As the self-critical Domestic broadcasts increased:
1. neutral attitudes toward the USSR increased/
2. favorable behavioral interactions toward the
USSR decreased or remained constant,
3. favorable behavioral interactions toward the
USSR plus allies decreased or remained constant/
4. unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. decreased,
5. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. increased or
remained constant,
6. unfavorable attitudes toward Latin America de-
creased, and
7. favorable behavior towards Latin America increased
or remained constant.
(EE) As self-critical Domestic broadcasts decreased:
1. unfavorable behavioral interactions toward the
U.S. increased or remained constant,
2. unfavorable behavioral interactions toward the
U.S. plus allies increased, and
3. unfavorable behavioral interactions toward Latin
America increased or remained constant.
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(F) As favorable attitudes toward the USSR increased:
1. favorable behavioral interactions toward the USSR
increased or remained constant,
2. favorable attitudes toward the USSR plus allies'
increased,
3. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased or remained constant, and
4. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased
or remained constant.
(FF) As favorable attitudes toward the USSR decreased:
1. unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. decreased,
and
2. unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased,
( G) As neutral attitudes toward the USSR increased:
1. favorable behavior towards the USSR decreased or
remained constant,
2. favorable behavior towards the USSR plus allies
decreased or remained constant,
3. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. increased or
remained constant,
4. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased or remained constant, and
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5. favorable behavior towards Latin America increased
or remained constant.
( GG) As neutral attitudes toward the USSR decreased:
1. favorable attitudes toward the USSR plus allies
increased,
2. neutral attitudes toward the USSR plus allies
decreased,
3. favorable behavior towards the USSR plus allies
increased or remained constant,
4. favorable behavior towards the U.S. decreased
or remained constant,
5. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. increased
or remained constant,
6. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased or remained constant,
7. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased,
8. favorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
decreased,
9. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
increased or remained constant,
10. unfavorable attitudes toward Latin America in-
creased,
11. favorable behavior towards Latin America decreased
or remained constant, and
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12. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased.
(GGG) As neutral attitudes toward the USSR remained con-
stant :
1. favorable behavior towards the USSR increased,
2. favorable behavior towards the USSR plus allies
increased,
3. unfavorable and neutral attitudes toward the U.S.
decreased,
4. favorable behavior towards the U.S. increased
or remained constant,
5. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. increased,
6. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
increased or remained constant,
7. neutral and unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S.
plus allies decreased,
8. favorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
increased or remained constant,
9. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
increased,
10. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased,
11. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased
or remained constant, and
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12. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased or remained constant.
(H) As favorable behavioral interactions toward the USSR
increased:
1. favorable behavior towards the USSR plus allies
increased,
2. unfavorable and neutral attitudes toward the U.S.
decreased,
3. favorable behavior towards the U.S. increased or
remained constant,
4. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. increased,
5. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
increased or remained constant,
6. neutral and unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S.
plus allies decreased,
7. favorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
increased or remained constant,
8. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
increased,
9. favorable attitudes toward Latin America in-
creased,
10. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased
or remained constant, and
11. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased or remained constant.
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(HH) As favorable behavior towards the USSR decreased:
1. favorable behavior towards the USSR plus allies
decreased or remained constant,
2. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. decreased
or remained constant,
3. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
remained constant,
4. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
decreased or remained constant,
5. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased
or remained constant, and
6. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased.
(HHH) As favorable behavior towards the USSR remained con-
stant:
1. favorable attitudes toward the USSR plus allies
increased,
2. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. increased or
remained constant,
3. favorable attitudes towards the U.S. plus allies
decreased or remained constant,
4. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased
or remained constant, and




(I) As favorable attitudes toward the USSR plus allies
increased:
1. favorable attitudes toward U.S. plus allies de-
creased or remained constant.
(II) As favorable attitudes toward the USSR plus allies
decreased:
1. favorable behavior towards the U.S. increased
or remained constant,
2. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
increased or remained constant,
3. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased
or remained constant,
4. favorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased or remained constant, and
5. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased.
(J) As neutral attitudes toward the USSR plus allies in-
creased :
1. favorable attitudes toward Latin America in-
creased or remained constant, and




(JJ) As neutral attitudes towards the USSR plus allies de-
creased:
1. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased or remained constant,
2. favorable behavior towards Latin America decreased
or remained constant, and
3. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased or remained constant.
(K) As favorable behavior towards the USSR plus allies
increased:
1. favorable behavior towards the U.S. increased
or remained constant,
2. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. increased,
3. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. decreased,
4. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
increased,
5. favorable attitudes toward Latin America in-
creased,
6. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased
or remained constant, and
7. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased or remained constant.




1. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. increased,
2. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. decreased
or remained constant,
3. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
remained constant,
4. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
increased,
5. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
decreased or remained constant,
6. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased
or remained constant, and
7. favorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased or remained constant.
(KKK) As favorable behavior towards the USSR plus allies
remained constant:
1. unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. decreased,
2. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. decreased or
remained constant,
3. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. increased
or remained constant,
4. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased or remained constant,
5. neutral and unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S.
plus allies decreased, and
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6. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
increased or remained constant,
(L) As unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. increased:
1. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. increased,
2. favorable and unfavorable behavior towards the
U.S. increased or remained constant,
3. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased or remained constant,
4. unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus
allies increased,
5. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus
allies increased or remained constant,
6. favorable attitudes toward Latin America in-
creased,
7. neutral attitudes toward Latin America de-
creased or remained constant,
8. unfavorable attitudes and behavior toward Latin
America increased, and
9. favorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased or remained constant,
(LL) As unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. decreased:
1. No consistencies or relationships were found to
exist with further categories.
177

(M) As neutral attitudes toward the U.S. increased:
1. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased or remained constant, and
2. favorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased or remained constant.
(MM) As neutral attitudes toward the U.S. decreased:
1. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. in-
creased or remained constant,
2. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
increased or remained constant,
3. neutral and unfavorable attitudes toward the
U.S. plus allies decreased,
4. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
increased, and
5. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased or remained constant.
(N) As favorable behavior towards the U.S. increased:
1. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. increased
or remained constant,
2. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased or remained constant,




4. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
increased or remained constant,
5. favorable attitudes toward the Latin America
increased, and
6. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased
or remained constant.
( NN) As favorable behavior towards the U.S. decreased:
1. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. decreased
or remained constant,
2. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
remained constant,
3. favorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
decreased,
4. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus
allies decreased or remained constant,
5. favorable attitudes toward Latin America de-
creased or remained constant, and
6. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased.
(NNN) As favorable behavior towards the U.S. remained con-
stant:
1. favorable behavior toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased or remained constant,
2. favorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased or remained constant, and
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3. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased.
(0) As unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. increased:
1. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased,
2. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
increased,
3. favorable attitudes toward Latin America in-
creased, and
4. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased
or remained constant.
(00) As unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. decreased:
1. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
remained constant,
2. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
increased,
3. favorable and unfavorable behavior towards the
U.S. plus allies decreased,
4. favorable attitudes toward Latin America de-
creased or remained constant,
5. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased,




7. favorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased or remained constant.
(000) As unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. remained
constant:
1. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. remained
constant,
2. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus
allies remained constant,
3. neutral attitudes toward Latin America in-
creased or remained constant, and
4. unfavorable attitudes and behavior towards
Latin America increased.
(P) As favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
increased:
1. other than the preceding, no further consistent
relationships occurred.
(PP) As favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased:
1. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased,
2. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
increased,




4. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased,
and
5. favorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased or remained constant.
(PPP) As favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
remained constant:
1. other than the preceding no further consistent
relationships occurred.
(Q) As neutral attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies in-
creased:
1. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus
allies decreased or remained constant,
2. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased
or remained constant, and
3. favorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased or remained constant.
(QQ) As neutral attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies de-
creased :
1. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
increased or remained constant.
( R) As unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
increased:
1. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased
or remained constant, and
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2. favorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased or remained constant.
(RR) As unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies
decreased:
1. other than the preceding, no future consistent
relationships occurred.
(S) As favorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
increased:
1. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus
allies increased or remained constant,
2. favorable attitudes toward Latin America in-
creased, and
3. neutral attitudes toward Latin America de-
creased or remained constant.
(SS) As favorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
decreased
:
1. other than the preceding, no further consistent
relationship occurred.
(SSS) As favorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
remained constant:




(T) As unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
increased:
1. favorable attitudes toward Latin America in-
creased, and
2. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased
or remained constant.
(TT) As unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies
decreased
:
1. favorable attitudes toward Latin America, de-
creased or remained constant,
2. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased,
3 unfavorable attitudes toward Latin America de-
creased, and
4. favorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased or remained constant.
(TTT) As unfavorable behavior towards, the U.S. plus allies
remained constant:
1. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased
or remained constant,
2. unfavorable attitudes toward Latin America in-
creased, and




(U) As favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased:
1. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased
or remained constant.
(UU) As favorable attitudes toward Latin America de-
creased:
1. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased,
2. favorable behavior towards Latin America de-
creased or remained constant, and
3. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased.
(UUU) As favorable attitudes toward Latin America re-
mained constant:
1. other than the preceding, no further consistent
relationships occurred.
(V) As neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased:
1. other than the preceding, no- further consistent
relationships occurred.
(W) As neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased:
1. other than the preceding, no further consistent
relationships occurred.
(VW) As neutral attitudes toward Latin America remained
constant
:




2. favorable and unfavorable behavior towards Latin
America increased.
(W) As unfavorable attitudes toward Latin America in-
creased:
1. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased.
(WW) As unfavorable attitudes toward Latin America de-
creased:
1. other than the preceding, no further relation-
ships occurred.
(X) As favorable behavior towards Latin America in-
creased:
1. other than the preceding, no further relation-
ships occurred.
(XX) As favorable behavior toward Latin America decreased:
1. unfavorable behavior towards' Latin America in-
creased or remained constant.
(XXX) As favorable behavior toward Latin America remained
constant:




C. APPLICABILITY TO THE POLICY-MAKING COMMUNITY
It is reasonable to assume that since all of the
forementioned trends were consistently related throughout
the present four and one-half year period, there is a
high probability that such relationships will continue to
exist in the future. With this assumption in mind, the
decisionmaker now has a means by which to attempt a valid
forecast towards a country's future attitudinal and be-
havioral patterns.
Applied to the intelligence community it is recog-
nized that the successful intelligence analyst will be
well-read and remain current with all facets of his
particular area. Generally, his data base will be a re-
sult of "all sources" of which FBIS may be only one.
Thus, any attempt at trending or analyzing a country's
current disposition or world view is usually a result of
a "gut feeling" of past and current trends, gained only
through experience on the part of the individual analyst.
Put another way, it would rarely be seen whereas a specific
country's attitudes and behavior towards any other actor
could be specifically and consistently determined through
usage of a tested methodology. However, with only a
minimum of familiarization with the two primary method-
ological tools used in this research, specifically Content
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Analysis, and WEIS procedures, it is reasonable to assume
that an analyst could employ this combination to arrive
at consistently derived past trends and a current state




IX. CUBA'S FUTURE AND A PRESCRIPTION
FOR THE U.S. POLICYMAKER
A. CUBA'S FUTURE
As a result of the 1970 harvest failures, the Cuban
regime is now moving toward a more institutionalized and
less militant revolutionary order. While other altern-
native tendencies exist, the most likely pattern of in-
stitutionalization for the future is that of a Soviet-
type, unless fundamental changes occur in Cuba's domestic
and especially international environment.
I should now like to discuss these other alternatives
and conclude by focusing on the Soviet-type. /Ref. 18, p. 229/
Each of these alternative futures presupposes con-
tinued rule by Fidel at least in a titular capacity as
head of the regime, and as the principal generator of mass
loyalty and legitimizing agent for the Cuban leadership.
ALTERNATIVE 1 - Toward Fidelista Populism .
Fidelista populism surfaced briefly and inconclusively
in the immediate aftermath of the harvest failure, most
likely as a reaction to the threat posed by ALTERNATIVE
3, yet to be discussed. Being more institutionally and
popularly oriented, it would strive to regain fidelista
hegemony with the support of those military elements
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most closely affiliated with Fidel, and to a lesser degree,
Raul Castro.
Though more responsive to the needs of the population
then in the past, fidelista populism would still strive to
preserve some of the revolutionary ferver of the 1960 's.
It would lay greater stress on radical socioeconomic ob-
jectives, and it would also maintain a more militant
posture toward the U.S. and Latin America. Toward the
latter, for instance, it would pursue a dual-track strategy
of endorsing armed revolution against those Latin American
states closely aligned with the U.S. while courting more
independent regimes such as Peru. Through continued em-
phasis on forcing the pace of development would prevent
major reallocations of resources to the consumer sector,
there nevertheless would be greater inclination to ease
austerity through improvements in distribution of goods and
services in order to maintain popular support.
Overall, this appears to be the most remote possibility
of the three alternatives, at the present time. The find-
ings of this research tend to support this conclusion in
the following manner:
1. the trend appears toward less emphasis on
promoting revolution,
2. a less militant posture towards the U.S. and
Latin America is indicated, and
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3. the Domestic broadcasts do not indicate a trend
towards easing austerity through improvements
in the distribution of goods and services to the
consumer.
ALTERNATIVE 2 - Toward "Tropical Titoism"
.
This would be toward institutionalization of the revolu-
tionary process along essentially national Communist or
revisionist lines with the aim of warding off further
Soviet ascendancy/ whether direct or indirect. This alter-
native was explicitly rejected by Fidel during the height
of his confrontation with the Soviets in 1968, because, at
the time it signified a moderation of the Revolution.
Nevertheless, it could become the most attractive altern-
ative since it is virtually the only one left in avoiding
institutionalization under a pro-Soviet framework.
Internally, it would lead to major realignments among
the elite elements within the Cuban hierarchy and to
significant alterations in Cuba's domestic and foreign
policies. Within the regime, it would require the for-
mation of a new, essentially anti-Soviet coalition of
fidelistas and non- fidelistas , opposed to rising Soviet and
PSP influence.
Owing to the heightened influence of more Western-
oriented elements of the Cuban leadership, this could lead
to the modernization and democratization of Cuba's internal
order- for example, through decentralization of the state
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economy, reintroduction of market relationships, possible
decollectivization of part of the agrarian sector, the
establishment of representative institutions for more
effective worker participation in plant management, and
popular participation in local government. Internationally,
this type regime would strive to adopt a more independent
posture which would reduce Cuba's dependence on the Soviet
bloc while avoiding a complete rupture. In turn, such a
nationalist posture would require further diversification
of Cuba's trade ties with Western Europe and Japan as well
as her partial reintegration into the Latin American com-
munity. It would also depend at a minimum, upon the
normalization of economic relations with the U.S.
This alternative appears to be realistic and has some
basis in fact, according to this research. During the
research the following trends were seen as indications
of this alternative becoming reality.
1. few favorable comments in support of Cuba's
dependence on the USSR,
2. few favorable comments ' advocating Cuba's
position as an instrument of the USSR,
3. significant attitudinal support was expressed
for the Bloc Deviants during most periods,
4. domestically, there were indications of de-
centralization of the economy, more worker
participation in plant management, and popular




5. greater economic interest and support was
exhibited for the Outliers (Japan, France,
Canada) and the countries of Non-Aligned
Europe, (Western Europe)
6. a tendency towards normalization of relations
with the U.S., and
7. a tendency towards reintegration into the
Latin American community, independent of the
OAS or any other U.S. controlled organization.
ALTERNATIVE 3 - Toward Soviet Bureaucratic Communism
.
Actually, the strongest tendency now emerging is to-
ward the institutionalization of the regime along the lines
of a more Sovietized bureaucratic order. This alternative
would impose the greatest limitations of Fidel's authority
and that of the fidelistas in the areas of economic policy-
making, public administration, and foreign affairs. It
would lead to the ascendence of technocratic and bureaucratic
elements drawn from civilian and military ranks. It would
also allow for greater influence by the "old Communists"
from the PSP who would strive to revitalize and strengthen
the role of the party. This tendency thus reflects the
current rise of Soviet influence over Cuban affairs as
well as Moscow's heightened ability to extract major policy
concessions from the Cuban leadership. In effect, the
Soviets would act as the external monitor, if not regulator,




The pivotal figure in the move toward a more Soviet-
ized bureaucratic order would be Raul Castro. He has long
enjoyed Moscow's confidence as a politically reliable
Cuban leader and a competent administrator, in marked con-
trast to his brother. Securely positioned in the govern-
ment, Raul could give internal impetus to the reorganization
of the Cuban government along lines acceptable to Moscow.
Moreover, he could provide the cementing link between two
divergent tendencies within the regime—the military and
civilian technicians or administrators on the one hand,
and his brother and the veteran fidelistas on the other.
On the economic front, this alternative would probably
speed Cuba's economic recovery due to more rational plan-
ning and orderly processes of goverance, and because it
could obtain even higher levels of Soviet bloc support.
The bureaucratic alternative would also continue many
of the post-1970 harvest trends in Cuba's domestic and
foreign affairs. Hence, it would be less committed to
societal redemption than was charismatic-hardship Communism.
Instead, it would place a premium on obtaining maximum pro-
duction and efficiency in the economy, and in order to do
it might resort to even higher levels of societal regimen-
tation, such as further enforcement of labor discipline
and repression of intellectual or popular dissent. On the
194

international front, it would be receptive to normalized
relations with more Latin American governments and possibly
to restoration—with Moscow's approval—of limited economic
ties with the U.S... (The current research sustains this
thesis) Nevertheless, Cuba would become more closely inte-
grated with the Soviets, while her heightened dependence
could augar an ever-increasing Soviet presence on the
island—not only politically and economically but also
militarily.
Too precipitous of a tendency toward Sovietized bureau-
cratic order could generate nationalist resentment. This
might occur with a highly visible Soviet political and
especially military presence—in contrast to thr low
visibility of the submarine servicing facility at Cienfuegos-
or in the event of an open attempt to depose Fidel from
power. Despite his tarnished image, the continued popular-
ity of the Cuban leader as the very symbol and incarnation
of the Revolution may well act as a deterrent to greater
influence by the Soviets and their domestic allies. Hence,
the movement toward a Soviet-style bureaucratic Communism
would probably try to work around and with Fidel rather
than to challenge him openly.
Of the three alternative futures, Gonzalez believed
that "Tropical Titoism" probably represents the most viable
19 5

internal pattern of institutionalization, since it would
strengthen the revolutionary coalition through closer align-
ment between fidelists and non- fidelista leadership elements.
/Ret. 18 p. 234_/ On the international front, however, the
Titoist alternative has thus far not been a realistic option
for the Cuban leadership. Neither Fidel nor other members
of the Cuban regime are likely to move towards this alter-
native, with all of its attendent risks of Soviet retaliations,
unless there is more assurance that the U.S. is prepared to
deal with a more independent Castro regime.
B. A PRESCRIPTION FOR THE U.S. POLICYMAKER
For the U.S. policymaker there is one macro-historical
trend which was predominant throughout the course of this
research. That is, while there was no consistently favor-
able relationship between Cuba and the USSR, there were
generally a decreasing amount of unfavorable indicators
(attitudes and behavior) toward the U.S., which should per-
haps be interpreted as a signal for the U.S. policymakers
to review our current policy towards Cuba.
As a starting point, the U.S. could take the initiative,
in active cooperation with other countries of the Western
Hemisphere, to lift collective and unilateral sanctions
imposed on Cuba. This can be accomplished by recognizing
that Cuban foreign policy has changed in deed, even as the
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rhetoric remains much the same, as this research demonstrated
It is important for us to remember that the undoing of neg-
ative policies does not commit the U.S. or the OAS to restore
Cuba's sugar quota, to readmit Cuba to the inter-American
system, to provide Cuba with strategic goods, or to re-
establish diplomatic relations.
In altering its public stance, the U.S. might event-
ually convince the Cuban leadership that the "Colossus of
the North" does not seek Cuba's return to her former client
status, but only her escape from an ever-increasing Soviet
influence. "Such a posture would need to convey a commit-
ment that the U.S. would refrain from attempting to depose
a more vulnerable Cuban regime that seeks to limit— let
alone to break—its protective association with Moscow.
"
/Ref. 17 p. 737/
Simultaneously, the U.S. would need to verify its good
intentions by providing Havana with the incentives for modi-
fying its policy. To this end, Washington might begin by
initiating the following action: /Ref. 37/
1. Congressional repeal of the 1962 Cuban Resolution,
2. Promptly inaugurate intensive consultations with-
in the OAS for rescinding its decision of 1964
establishing diplomatic and economic sanctions
against Cuba. (This action would free each mem-
ber to deal bilaterally with Cuba)
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3. Given a constructive Cuban response to the
OAS decision, the U.S. would declare its
intention to end its economic blockade of
Cuba, and lift other restrictions on travel
and Cuban participation in specialized con-
ferences and sporting events held in the U.S.
4. With this reestablishment, the U.S. and Cuba
could start the long and difficult process
of negotiating the new foundation on which
mutually acceptable relations between the
two countries would rest. Among these basic
issues are:
a) trade agreement, including the resumption
of traditional Cuban sugar exports to the
U.S.,
b) compensation settlement for nationalized
U.S. properties. (Although the Castro
government postponed any such settlement
indefinitely, it never denied ultimate
responsibility for such indemnification)
,
c) refugee interests,
d) the future of Guantanamo Bay (a strong
case could be made that both the U.S. Naval
Ease and the Soviet missile emplacements
are obsolete and thoroughtly useless, even
if a military engagement between the two
nations were to occur. As evidence, one
could cite the Bay of Pigs experience where
neither a naval presence or a missile appar-
atus was of any value, and
e) cultural exchanges.
I am not suggesting an ideological change of heart is
necessary, or even that such stages of a concordat would
result in the internal liberalization of either of the two
antagonists. The point is, that given the relative autonomy
of foreign policy in both countries, one might expect a
198

genuine easing of hemispheric tensions. Surely problems
will remain. No attempt is being made to compromise the
integrity of the two regimes involved—or the worth of
capitalism or socialism as such. However, if the U.S.-
Cuban relations are to be different in the future, some such







Oil Surrender, yield to order,
submit to arrest, etc.
012 Yield position; retreat;
evacuate
013 Admit wrongdoing: retract
statement
2. COMMENT
021 Explicit decline to comment
022 Comment on situation -
pessimistic
023 Comment on situation -
neutral
024 Comment on situation -
optimistic
025 Explain policy or future
position
3. CONSULT
031 Meet with; at neutral site;
or send note; stay in same
place
032 Visit; go to; leave country
033 Receive visit; host
4. APPROVE
041 Praise, hail, applaud, con-
dolences, ceremonial greet-
ings, thanks
042 Endorse others policy or
position, give verbal support
5. PROMISE
051 Promise own policy support
052 Promise material support




061 Express regret; apologize
062 Give state invitation
063 Grant asylum
064 Grant privilege, diplomatic


















082 Agree to future
action or procedure;




091 Ask for information
092 Ask for policy assist-
ance; seek
093 Ask for material
assistance
094 Request action; call
for; ask for asylum




102 Urge or suggest action
or policy
11. REJECT
111 Turn down proposal;
reject protest
demand, threat, etc.
112 Refuse; oppose; re-
fuse to allow; ex-
clude

Appendix A - Cont'd
12. ACCUSE
121 Charge; criticize blame
disapprove
122 Denounce; denigrate; abuse;
condemn
13. PROTEST
131 Make complaint (not formal)
132 Make formal complaint or
protest
14. DENY
141 Deny an accusation
142 Deny an attributed policy/
action, role, or position
15. DEMAND
150 Issue order or command,




171 Threat without specific
negative sanctions
172 Threat with specific non-military
negative sanctions
173 Threat with force specified
174 Ultimatum; threat with negative
sanctions and time limit specified
18. DEMONSTRATE
181 Non-military demonstration; walk
out on; boycott
182 Armed force mobilization, exer-
cise, and/or display
19. REDUCE RELATIONSHIP (as Neg. Sanction)
191 Cancel or postpone planned event
192 Reduce routine international activity;
recall officials, etc.
193 Reduce or suspend aid or assistance
194 Halt negotiations
195 Break diplomatic relations
20. EXPEL
201 Order personnel out of country; deport
202 Expel organization of group
21. SEIZE
211 Seize position or
possessions
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